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ABSTRACT
By collecting and analyzing more than two million tweets, U.S. House Represen-
tatives’ voting records in 111th and 113th Congress, and data from other resources
I study several aspects of adoption and use of Twitter by Representatives. In the
first chapter, I study the overall impact of Twitter use by Representatives on their
political orientation and their political alignment with their constituents. The findings
show that Representatives who adopted Twitter moved closer to their constituents in
terms of political orientation. By using supervised machine learning and text mining
techniques, I shift the focus to synthesizing the actual content shared by Representa-
tives on Twitter to evaluate their effects on Representatives’ political polarization in
the second chapter. I found support for the effects of repeated expressions and peer
influence in Representatives’ political polarization. Last but not least, by employing a
recently developed dynamic network model (separable temporal exponential-family
random graph model), I study the effects of homophily on formation and dissolution
of Representatives’ Twitter communications in the third chapter. The results signal
the presence of demographic homophily and value homophily in Representatives’
Twitter communications networks. These three studies altogether provide a complete
picture about the overall consequences and dynamics of use of OSN platforms by
Representatives.
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Chapter 1
THE IMPACT OF TWITTER ADOPTION ON LAWMAKERS’ VOTING
ORIENTATIONS
Organizations have been using social media extensively to learn about their
current and potential customers, but little is known if such endeavors truly influence
organizations’ decisions to make them closer to their customers. This chapter studies
this question in a unique context – the impact of U.S. Representatives’ Twitter adoption
on their voting orientations in The Congress. In particular, I consider whether the
adoption of Twitter by Representatives makes them to vote more in line with the
political ideology of their constituents. I constructed a panel data for 445 Members of
the 111th U.S. House of Representatives across a period of 24 months. I exploit the
variation in joining Twitter across Representatives to identify the impact of joining and
using Twitter on voting orientations. Using fixed effects and difference-in-difference
approaches along with Propensity Score Matching to address potential endogeneity
in Representatives’ Twitter adoption decisions, I found that the adoption of Twitter
by Representatives makes them to vote more in line with their constituents. I also
found that the effect of Twitter adoption is more salient, when a Representative’s
party differs from the party affiliation of his/her district and when Twitter use per
capita is higher in a Representative’s state.
Keywords: Online Social Media, Twitter, Societal Impact of IS, Decision-Making
in Politics, U.S. House of Representatives, Panel Data, Difference-in-Difference Model
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1.1 Introduction
Online social networking (OSN) platforms have profoundly changed the way we
communicate, collaborate, and make decisions. The salient impacts of these platforms
on the societies can be observed in numerous cases. For example, microblogging
platforms, such as Twitter, have been widely credited as a key enabler of Arab Spring,
Spain and Portugal movements in 2011, and Turkey and Brazil movements in 2013.
OSN platforms are known to facilitate the participations of consumers and the public
in business (Edvardsson et al. 2011; Goh et al. 2013; Luo et al. 2013; Rishika et al.
2013), government decision making processes (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010; Linders,
2012), and political campaigns (Bond et al., 2012; Wattal, Schuff, Mandviwalla, &
Williams, 2010). However, little is known about the degree to which such participations
truly affect firms or organizations’ decision outcomes.
The U.S. political system provides a rare opportunity where the most important
decision outcomes made by U.S. politicians – voting decisions– are observable to the
public. Additionally, the wide reach of OSN platforms has convinced many American
politicians to be active on these platforms. A 2012 study by Greenberg revealed that
nearly 98% of the U.S. Representatives adopted at least one social media platform
as a communication and outreach tool (Greenberg, 2012). Twitter and Facebook are
the most popular OSN platforms among the Members of Congress. In the House of
Representatives, 75 percent had both Twitter and Facebook accounts (Riper, 2013).
Moreover, the analysis of the post contents by Representatives in Greenberg’s study
revealed that the majority of them are politically relevant posts. Online social media
not only help lawmakers to communicate their messages to the constituents, but
also provide the constituents with a channel to interact with their representatives
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in a convenient way. According to a Congressional Management Foundation report
based on a survey on more than 10,000 voters, many believe that “the Internet has
become the primary source for learning about and communicating with Congress.”
(Goldschmidt & Ochreiter, 2008) According to another report by Congressional
Management Foundation, 42% of the 138 surveyed senior managers (primarily Chiefs
of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Legislative Directors) and social media managers in
Congressional offices consider Twitter an important tool for understanding constituents’
views and opinions (Congressional Management Foundation, 2011). Golbeck et al.
(2010) analyzed all of the tweets posted by Members of Congress during a two-month
period and discovered that 7.4% of the tweets posted by Members are for one-on-one
communication with constituents. They maintained, “one benefit that does appear
to arise from Members of Congress using Twitter is the potential for increased direct
communication with constituents.” (Golbeck et al., 2010)
Overall, the adoption and use of online social networks by politicians has the poten-
tial to facilitate communications between constitutes and Representatives. However,
it is not clear to what extent the adoption and use of Twitter by Representatives truly
influences the political decisions of the Representatives.
This study contributes to the stream of IS research on the societal and political
impact of online social networks. OSN platforms have been known for empowering
citizens, and improving transparency, participation, and equality (Chen et al. 2012).
However, the focus of the extant literature has been on participation and engagement
with the new media and less on the societal outcomes. In this research, I use the U.S.
Representatives’ voting orientations to assess to what degree the public influences
organizational decisions through OSN platforms. In particular, I examine whether the
3
Figure 1. Representative Mike Honda’s (D- CA 17) Website Reveals the Importance
of Social Media for Politicians
adoption of OSNs moves politicians’ voting orientations closer to the views of their
constituents.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature. Section 3 presents This data, variables, and descriptive statistics. Section
4 discusses the empirical approach. Section 5 reports the results of the analyses. I
discuss these findings and conclude with limitations and potential extension of this
study in Sections 6 and 7.
4
1.2 Research Background
The IS literature has addressed a variety of societal issues including the digital
divide (Riggins & Dewan, 2005), e-government services (Carter & Bélanger, 2005),
political campaigns (Wattal et al., 2010), prevalence of HIV (Chan & Ghose, 2014),
social inclusion of refugees in the host society (Andrade and Doolin forthcoming),
and well-being of nations (Ganju et al. forthcoming). In addition, particularly
after President Obama’s successful social media campaign in 2008, researchers in a
variety of other disciplines including political science have examined the role of online
technologies such OSN platforms on political environment.
All of the studies mentioned above unveiled some level of societal impact of IS.
To explain the mechanism of impact, Burt (1992) and Wu (2013) proposed that
information systems function as enablers for accessing information. Burt (1992)
theorized that three distinct informational benefits drive the impact: access, timing,
and referrals. Information systems could work as networks hosting useful information
and therefore could allow users to access more information in a timely manner.
Furthermore, the users can obtain recommendations from trusted acquaintances.
These mechanisms may change users’ decisions and, therefore, their performance
(Wu, 2013). Overall, this perspective focuses on information cascaded within the
network. A new user who joins a network has the opportunity to seek new information
within the network. Regardless whether the user is a patient who seeks relevant
information to deal with the illness, or a buyer who seeks information about a certain
type of product, information-rich networks could help the user in achieving their goals.
For politicians, an information-rich network is a network that allows them to seek
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information from constituents. After all, politicians are representing the constituents
and need to understand their preferences when making decisions in Capitol Hill.
OSNs provide information-rich networks for politicians as these networks contain
rich real-time information about the constituents, their behaviors, and their preferences.
According to Adam Conner, President Obama’s campaign social media strategist,
“When it comes to receiving advice, our leaders may find it better to listen to a
housewife, [rather than] a detached-from-reality financier [who only wants to] make
profit and practice what he was taught in Harvard. . . So, if I was our leaders, I would
pay more attention to what the people have to say in social media and blogs. . . ”
(Debating Europe, 2013) In another statement he claims: ”[Social media puts pressure
on governments] almost to the point of removing civil society/NGOs and mainstream
media from the debate. . . [Informing] the great unwashed masses directly is by far the
best method to keep both traction and momentum with any policy.” (Debating Europe,
2013) Therefore, not only OSN platforms provide politically active constituents with
an open channel to communicate with the politicians, but also they provide a new way
for less politically-active citizens to be heard by their representatives. For instance,
a study of 61 million of Facebook users on 2010 Election Day found that political
messages in OSNs have a measurable effect on political self-expression, information
seeking and real-world voting behavior of millions of people (Bond et al., 2012).
Another study conducted by The European Parliament found that the new media
(OSNs) may help women to achieve a higher level of political involvement (OpCit
Research 2013). In this perspective, OSNs can allow the politicians to interact with
less politically-involved citizens and therefore a more representative sample of the
constituents and their preferences. Due to these effects of OSN platforms, I propose
6
that the adoption of OSNs by politicians can help them to vote more in line with the
wish of their constituents.
1.3 Data
To study the impact of the adoption of Twitter on the voting orientation of
politicians, I constructed a panel data for 445 Members of the 111th U.S. House of
Representatives across a period of 24 months.
1.3.0.1 Dependent Variables
Spanning the 111th Congress, I estimate the monthly measure of Representatives’
voting orientations based on votes cast by each Representative in a given month.
I use Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation (WNOMINATE), a widely used
estimation model in political science, for the estimation (Poole, Lewis, Lo, & Carroll,
2011).1 WNOMINATE is “a scaling procedure that performs parametric unfolding
of binary choice data.” (Poole & Rosenthal, 1985) Given a matrix of binary choices
by individuals (i.e., Yea or Nay) over a series of congressional votes, WNOMINATE
produces a configuration of legislators and outcome points for the Yea and Nay
alternatives for each roll call using a probabilistic model of choice. WNOMINATE
creates a spectrum of scores ranging from -1 to +1, with -1 representing the most
liberal Representative and +1 representing the most conservative Representative
(Figure 2). It is worth mentioning that the WNOMINATE scores have been widely
1Please refer to Appendix A for further information about WNOMINATE and the estimation
procedure.
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employed by political scientists to study the behaviors of the politicians based on
their voting records (Aldrich & Battista, 2002; Aldrich, Montgomery, & Sparks, 2014;
Lupu, 2013).
To study the extent of political misalignment between Representatives and their
constituents, I needed to obtain a measure for political ideology of the constituents
in addition to Representatives’ voting orientation. I obtained such measure from
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013). Similar to WNOMINATE scores for Represen-
tatives, constituents’ scores measure the average policy preferences by estimating
the extent to which a Congressional district leans toward Democrat or Republican
parties. To estimate the constituents’ scores, Tausanovitch and Warshaw employ
item response theory to jointly scale the policy preferences of respondents to seven
recent, large-scale national surveys (the 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 Cooperative
Congressional Election Surveys) in all 50 states. Then, they use this large sample
to estimate the average policy preferences of voters in every Congressional district.
They generate estimates of mean policy preferences using multilevel regression with
post-stratification. It is worth noting that this measure has been employed in other
empirical studies to capture the political ideology of the constituents (Bonica, 2014).
Since the scale of constituents’ estimates are different from that of WNOMINATE es-
timates, I normalized both estimates using Min-Max-Scaling such that both estimates
range from zero to one, with zero being the most liberal Representative/ Congressional
district and one being the most conservative Representative/ Congressional district.
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Figure 2. Average WNOMINATE scores for Members of 111th House of
Representatives
1.3.1 Predictor and Control Variables
To capture the dates Representatives adopted Twitter, I made API calls to Twitter
API and Sunlight Foundation’s Congress API, which helped us to link Representatives’
Twitter accounts to their legislative data. Out of 445 Representatives, 246 had Twitter
accounts by the end of the 111th Congress. Among the 246 Representatives, 42 had an
account before the start of the 111th Congress and 204 joined Twitter during the 111th
Congress (January 2009 – December 2010). With this data, I constructed a binary
Twitter adoption indicator (twitter status) for each Representative for a given month.
For every month, the value of this binary variable is either 1 if the Representative
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joined Twitter before or during that month or zero otherwise. From Twitter, I also
collected three more data sets: 1- All of the tweets posted by the Representatives
during each month of the 111th Congress. A total of 67,366 tweets were collected
from the Representatives’ accounts. 2- All of the tweets in which the Representatives’
Twitter handles (official usernames) were mentioned.2 This data contains 394,389
tweets. 3- All of the tweets in which the Representatives’ names (first name and last
name) were mentioned.3 A total of 1,553,442 tweets were recorded in this data.
I further collected data from The Library of Congress (THOMAS), U.S. Census,
NY Times API, voteview.com, The Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and
hubspot.com about the Representatives and their constituents. Table 1 provides the
descriptions and the summary statistics for these variables.
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the data. The mean and standard
deviation for Representative’s voting orientations is consistent with prior studies
(Poole et al., 2011). The mean of Representative’s voting orientations denotes that
the 111th Congress was slightly leaned toward the conservative side of the political
spectrum as it is larger than 0.5. The mean of Constituents’ political ideology denotes
that the constituents were also leaned toward the conservative side of the political
spectrum.
2The Representatives’ retweets were removed from this data set and only the mentions were kept.
3I used the exact first name & last name that were used in the Library of Congress database.
Representatives Mike Rogers (R- MI 8) and Mike Rogers (R- AL 3) were dropped due to the similarity
of their names. It is worth noting that I did not have any practical approach to determine if the
tweet is indeed about the Representative or someone else with the same exact first and last names.
This is one of the limitations of this study.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables
Note: For months August 2009 and August 2010, the WNOMINATE scores were not
estimated as the House of Representatives was in recess. I also excluded
Representatives who voted on less than twenty bills during any given month (please
refer to Appendix A). Tweets frequency is the number of tweets posted by the
Representatives during any given month. Handle-mentions frequency is the number
of tweets in which the Representatives’ Twitter handles were mentioned on Twitter in
any given month. Name-mentions frequency is the number of tweets in which the
Representatives’ first name & last name were mentioned on Twitter in any given
month.
Political misalignment captures the distance between the Representative’s voting
orientations and the constituent’s political ideologies. The largest possible value for
this variable is 1 where the Representative is on one end of the political spectrum
and the constituent is on the other end. During the 111th Congress, the maximum
value for this variable was 0.874. On average, the political misalignment was 0.211.
On average, the Representatives posted about 6 tweets during each month and their
Twitter handles were mentioned about 37 times per month.
I construct three time-variant instrumental variable to account for the effects of
time-variant unobservables. Valid instruments need to correlate with the decision
to adopt but affect the dependent variable only through the adoption decision. I
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Figure 3. Example of name-mentions for Representative John Dingell (D –MI 15)
before He Joined Twitter
construct the first instrumental variable (name-mentions frequency) by counting the
number of tweets in which the Representatives’ first name & last name were mentioned
on Twitter sphere in any given month. I obtained 1,553,442 tweets by making API
calls to Twitter API. Mentioning the Representative by first name and last name is
not controlled by the Representatives. That is, every Twitter user can mention the
Representatives even though they have not created a Twitter account. I believe that
those Representatives who are mentioned frequently have a higher tendency to create
an account and use this channel to communicate with the citizens. Therefore, I argue
that the number of Representatives’ name-mentions in Twitter sphere would be a
good choice of instrument. According to Table 1, Representatives were mentioned 146
times per month on average.
Second instrument (committee effect) is created by counting the number of peers
(other Representatives) who joined Twitter at each time period t and who served at
the same committees that Representative i is a member of. The rationale is that
the choice to use Twitter among Representatives from the same committees may
be correlated. That is, if more Representatives whom Representative i knows (and
regularly interacts with in the committee meetings) adopt Twitter, Representative
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i may be more inclined to adopt as well. The value of this instrumental variable
ranges from 0 to 122 with a mean of 17. I constructed the third instrument (neighbor
effect) by counting the proportion of peers from Representative i’s state who joined
Twitter at each time period t. Again the idea is that the choice to adopt Twitter
among Representatives from the same state may be correlated (Golbeck et al., 2010;
Peterson, 2012). According to Table 2, one third of a given Representative’s peers
from the same state are on Twitter. It is worth noting that all three instruments were
employed in models 1, 2, 4, and 5.
Table 2. Summary Statistics And Descriptions for Control Variables
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1.4 Empirical Methodology
The adoption of Twitter by Representatives over time creates a quasi-natural
experiment setting that allows the comparison of difference in voting orientations
before and after adopting Twitter. I exploit the variation in joining Twitter across
Representatives as the basis for identifying the impact of adopting Twitter on voting
behavior. This strategy has been implemented in numerous research studies including
(Chan & Ghose, 2014; Dranove, Kessler, Mcclellan, & Satterthwaite, 2003; Jin &
Leslie, 2003; Sun & Zhu, 2013). I further address the endogeneity of adoption decision
through using instrumental variables, propensity score matching, and external events
and the serial correlation problem through using ignoring the time series data and
randomization inference as proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004). To assess the effect of
Twitter adoption on Representatives’ voting behavior, I employ the following model:
yit = β0 + β1Qi + β2Qi × xit +
24∑
j=1
γjMonthDummyj + it (1.1)
Where i is the index for Representatives and t is the index for time, t = 01-2009,
02-2009, . . . , 12-2010; Qi is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if Representative i is an
eventual adopter, and 0 otherwise. I call this variable “adopter”. xit (twitter status) is
the binary variable for adopting Twitter, meaning that xit = 1 if Representative i has
a Twitter account at time t and zero otherwise. I also include dummies for each month
from January 2009 to December 2010 to control for changes in Representatives’ average
propensity to vote in favor of liberal or conservative initiatives. I use Specification
1.1 to study the impact of Representatives’ adoption of Twitter on two response
variables (yit). For the first response variable, I use Representatives’ voting orientations
(normalized WNOMINATE). β2 is the difference-in-differences estimator that captures
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the adoption’s effect on voting orientations of the Representatives. A positive and
significant value for β2 means that the Representatives became more conservative after
the adoption and a negative and significant value for β2 means that the Representatives
became more liberal. For the second response variable I use political misalignment.
To construct political misalignment, I subtract normalized constituents’ political
ideology from each Congressman’s voting orientations and take the absolute values. A
decrease in political misalignment means that Representative is more aligned with
the constituent in terms of voting orientations. An increase in political misalignment
means that Representative has become less aligned with the constituent in terms of
voting orientation. Again, β2 is the difference-in-differences estimator that captures
the adoption’s effect on political misalignment between the Representatives and their
constituents. A positive and significant value for β2 means that the Representatives
became less aligned with their constituents after the adoption and a negative and
significant value for β2 means that the Representatives became more aligned with
their constituents in terms of voting orientations.
1.5 Results
For model-free evidence, Table 3 provides a comparison between the adopters and
non-adopters before and after their adoption of Twitter. Compared to non-adopters,
eventual adopters had much lower mean voting orientation before they adopted Twitter
(0.484 vs 0.386). However after the adoption, the adopters had a higher mean voting
orientation. That is, adopters became more conservative after joining Twitter.
According to Table 3, the constituents of Representatives who adopted Twitter
during the 111th Congress had a mean voting orientation of 0.606. The constituents
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Table 3. Comparison of Means between Eventual adopters And Non-adopters
of Representatives who did not adopt Twitter at all during the 111th Congress had a
slightly higher mean voting orientation (0.624) meaning that the adoption of Twitter
by Representatives from less conservative districts was slightly higher than that of
Representatives from more conservative districts. Among the adopter districts, the
political misalignment becomes 14.1
Table 4 reports the estimation results. Model 1 reports the results based on fixed
effects specification with instrumental variables using two-stage least-squares (2SLS).
The fixed effects control for observed and unobserved time invariants such as age,
gender, longevity of service, and constituents’ characteristics across the Representatives.
The coefficient for adopter × twitter status which reflects the average effect of the
adoption on the adopter group is significant and positive. According to Model 1,
adopters’ voting orientation increases by 9.1 percentage points after the adoption.
Since adopter does not vary over time, the coefficient for this variable in Models 1 and
4 are dropped. Model 2 reports the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model
with 2SLS specification. Adopter has a negative and significant coefficient meaning
that, before the adoption, the eventual adopters had a lower voting orientation (more
liberal) than did the non-adopters. The coefficient for the interaction term is significant
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and positive indicating that the eventual adopters’ voting orientation shifts toward
the conservative spectrum after the adoption by 18.8 percentage points.
Model 3 reports the results with the zero-one inflated beta distribution (ZOIB)
specification.4 The reason for using this specification is that both voting orientation
and political misalignment’s range of values is bounded. That is, voting orientation
and political misalignment are only allowed to vary from 0 to +1. Since the OLS
specification assumes a normal distribution, the linear specification may not work well
in this setting. According to Kieschnick and McCullough (2003), parametric regression
models based on beta distribution are recommended for these data. Particularly, the
ZOIB model has been adopted in political science literature when WNOMINATE
scores were employed to construct the outcome variable (Burmester & Jankowski,
2014). The ZOIB model consists of three separate regression models: 1- a logistic
regression model for whether or not the proportion equals 0, 2- a logistic regression
model for whether or not the proportion equals 1, and 3- a beta regression model for
the proportions between 0 and 1 (Buis, 2010a).
For model 3 in Table 4, both the coefficients and their marginal effects are provided.
The coefficient for adopter is significant and negative indicating that the adopters were
more liberal than the non-adopters by an average of 0.078 points. The interaction
between adopter and twitter status is significant and positive. After adopting Twitter,
Representatives become almost 0.15 points more conservative according to the marginal
effect in model 3. The outcome variable in Models 4 to 6 is political misalignment.
Similar to Model 1, Model 4 reports the results of FE/2SLS specification. The
coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant. According to this result,
Representatives who adopted Twitter during 111th Congress became 0.01 point more
4The model was executed in STATA using the user-generated module ZOIB (Buis, 2010b).
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aligned with their constituents. Given that the mean political misalignment is 0.211
(Table 1), 0.01 point change corresponds to approximately 5% more alignment. Model
5 reports the results based on OLS/2SLS regression. This model does not reveal
any significant difference in political misalignment between eventual adopters and
non-adopters prior to the adoption. However, the interaction term is significant and
negative. On average, the political misalignment for a Representative decreases by
0.039 points after he/she adopts Twitter. Model 6 reports the results of ZOIB model.
Again, based on this model the adopters and non-adopters do not have a significant
difference in terms of political misalignment before the adoption by adopters. On the
other hand, the coefficients and the marginal effects are both negative and significant
for the interaction term. According to the marginal effects, Representatives who adopt
Twitter further align with their constituents by 0.046 points.
I employed Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in models 2, 3, 5, and 6.
I also included dummies for each month from January 2009 to December 2010 to
control for changes in overall shifts in Representatives’ voting behavior. The error
terms in models 2, 3, 5, and 6 are clustered at the Representative level to account
for autocorrelation in the data across Representatives and over time (Bertrand et al.
2004). To check the robustness of the findings, I also removed those Representatives
who adopted Twitter prior to January 2009 and then replicated the analysis for the
new sample. I further allowed time interactions by treated and control groups and
replicated the analysis. The results were not significantly different from the results
presented in table 4.5
I next examine the effect of Twitter use on the Representatives’ voting orientations.
5Due to the similarity of the results with those in table 4, I did not report them here. But they
can be provided upon request.
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Table 4. Impact of Twitter on Voting Orientation & Political Misalignment
Note 1 : Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors were employed.
Note 2 : Within panel R-squared is reported in FE models.
Note 3 : First-stage estimates for instrumental variables are reported in Appendix B.
Note 4 : Wald Chi2 instead of F-statistic is reported for ZOIB models.
Note 5 :In ZOIB models, the size of the coefficients are not interpretable. Therefore,
marginal effects are reported and should be used for interpretation. Marginal effects
for adopter and adopter × twitter status represent the percentage point changes in
the proportions by shifting from the control group to the treatment group.
* Significant at 0.05, ** Significant at 0.01, *** Significant at 0.001
Since the use of Twitter by adopters could be heterogeneous (for instance some of
the Representatives may not actively use Twitter after they create the accounts),
I use the log number of tweets posted by the Representatives during each month
(tweets frequency) as an indicator for use and run two models with FE specification
to study the relationship between Twitter use and voting orientation and political
misalignment. According to Table 5, the coefficient for tweets frequency is positive and
significant in Model 7 and negative and significant in Model 8. These results further
support the initial findings about the role of Twitter in voting orientation and political
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misalignment. That is, the frequency of tweets posted by Representatives is associated
with a) more conservatism and b) better political alignment with constituents.
Table 5. Impact of Twitter on Voting orientation and political misalignment
Note: Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors were employed.
*** Significant at 0.001
I also used the number of tweets in which the Representatives’ Twitter handles
(handle-mentions frequency) were mentioned on Twitter in any given month as an
indicator for constituents’ use of Twitter.6 According to table 6, the coefficient
for handle-mentions frequency is positive and significant in model 9 and negative
and significant in model 10. The latter indicates that the Representatives who are
mentioned more frequently on Twitter sphere, tend to be more aligned with the
constituents.
6It is worth noting that I was unable to determine which tweets were from which Congressional
district. Therefore, it is not clear if the tweet was indeed from the constituent. Although this would
be regarded as a limitation of this study, I argue that this information is mostly not available to the
Representatives either.
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Table 6. Impact of Twitter on Voting orientation and political misalignment
Note: Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors were employed.
*** Significant at 0.001
1.5.1 Addressing the Selection Bias
The Representatives’ decision of adopting Twitter can be correlated with their
voting orientation. For instance, it could be that those Representatives who decide to
be more aligned with their constituents also decide to establish a new communication
channel with them. Therefore, the decision for adoption Twitter (or selecting to be in
treatment or control group) could be endogenous to Representatives’ voting orientation.
Although fixed effects are useful in controlling for time-invariant unobservables, they do
not control for time-variant unobservables that may be correlated with the decision to
adopt Twitter. These time-variant unobservables could lead, for example, to different
trends over time for adopters and non-adopters. One way to address this issue would
be to employ time-variant instrumental variables. However, the instrumental variables
approach that I have undertaken to address the selection problem relies on validity
of the instruments. Because I are unable to empirically test the exogeneity of the
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instrumental variables, I employ a variety of methods in the following section to
address the selection bias.
1.5.1.1 Propensity Score Matching
One of the methods for evaluating the potential selection effects is propensity-score
matching (PSM) approach (DiPrete & Gangl, 2004; Leuven & Sianesi, 2014; Sun &
Zhu, 2013). The instrumental variable approach and the propensity-score matching
approach rely on different sets of assumptions. The instrumental variable approach
relies on exogenous variables to purge the effects of unobservables on the decision to
adopt. Propensity-score matching corrects for selection bias by matching adopters
with non-adopters based on observables. Under propensity-score matching scheme, I
used Representative’s age, gender, seniority in Congress, percentage of party-favored
votes, number of sponsored bills, number of co-sponsored bills, percent of missed votes,
voting orientation7 , constituent’s mean household income, percent of high school
graduates, percent of white population as attributes to be matched upon. Table 2
provides the descriptions and summary statistics for these variables.
Since the PSM method requires one pre-event and one post-event observation for
each subject, and since Representatives created their Twitter accounts in different
months of the study, I run the model for each month8 during which at least ten
Representatives adopted Twitter. For each month I first collapse each of the outcome
variables, yit , into simple averages before and after that month for each Represen-
7The voting orientation in this case is yprei which will be described later.
8Excluding the first month (January 2009). The reason is that Representatives’ voting orientation
is not observed prior to this period.
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Figure 4. The Frequency of adopters during Each Calendar Month
tative i, and denote these averages as yprei and y
post
i . Then for each month, I run
a Difference-in-Difference model that compares the changes (∆yi = yposti − yprei ) in
voting orientation of Representatives who adopted Twitter during that month with
matched Representatives who never adopted Twitter during The 111th Congress. It
is worth noting that along with the time invariant variables I used for matching, I
also include yprei for matching. This would help us to compare the Representatives
whose voting orientation scores were similar before the adoption. For each month,
the PSM matches every adopter with one similar non-adopter. Then using a logit
model, I compare ∆yi for adopters and similar non-adopters for each month. Figure 4
shows the number of adopters during each calendar month. According to Figure 4,
the majority of the Representatives created their accounts in the first year of 111th
Congress. Table 7 reports the results of the difference-in-difference estimates under
the propensity-score matching scheme.
Twitter status estimates in Model 13 remains positive and statistically significant
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Table 7. PSM Estimates
Note 1 : Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Note 2 : Logit model was used for estimations.
Note 3 : At least one Representative from Non-adopter group was matched for every
adopter at each month.
* Significant at 0.05, ** Significant at 0.01, *** Significant at 0.001
for every month except for May 2009. The impact of Twitter adoption on changes in
voting orientation ranges from 0.031 points to 0.075 points. The impact of Twitter
adoption on changes in political misalignment remains negative and significant for
every month except for June 2009. The impact of Twitter adoption on changes in
political misalignment ranges from -0.031 to -0.137.
1.5.1.2 External Events
Along with instrumental variable and propensity score matching techniques, I
further address the potential endogenity of Twitter adoption by narrowing down the
sample to only those who created their Twitter account during the month of June 2010.
The reason is that in May/19/2010 Twitter launched Twitter for iPhone and iPod
for free on the iTunes App Store (Stone, 2010). Given the fact that iPhone was the
most popular mobile device among the Members of Congress as it was claimed that
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more than 71% of them use iPhone (Hattem, 2014)9, I believe that this external event
may have motivated some of the Representatives to start using Twitter. Particularly,
June 2010 had the highest number of adopters in the second half of the Congress and
the decision of creating a social media account due to the availability of the app for
mobile devices is unlikely to be correlated with the changes in Representatives’ voting
orientation. Table 8 reports the estimation results for Representatives who adopted
Twitter in June 2010 and Representatives who never adopted. According to the results
in Table 8, the interaction term is significant and positive for voting orientation and
significant and negative for political misalignment, confirming the previous findings.
The effect of Twitter adoption on voting orientation according to the marginal effects
is 0.060 points increase. The magnitude of the effect for political misalignment is
about the same as the previous results. On average, a Representative who adopted
Twitter in June 2010 becomes 0.033 points more aligned with the constituent after
the adoption.
1.5.1.3 Twitter Usage & political misalignment
If indeed the adoption of Twitter by Representatives influences their decisions
in favor of the constituents, it is expected that in geographic regions where citizens
use Twitter more often the magnitude of the influence to be larger. Therefore, I
collected data about per capita usage of Twitter per state10 to compare the influence
9I also counted the number of Representatives’ tweets that were posted by iPhone using a
random sample drawn from another data set. I found that more than 11% of the tweets posted by
Representatives in 113th Congress were sent from an iPhone.
10It is worth noting that the district level data could not be obtained. Therefore I used data
from http://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/7905/Twitter-Usage-Per-Capita-How-States-
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Table 8. Impact of Twitter on Voting orientation and political misalignment (June
2010 adopters)
Note 1 : Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Note 2 : Within panel R-squared is reported in FE models.
Note 3 : Wald Chi2 instead of F-statistic is reported for ZOIB models.
* Significant at 0.05, ** Significant at 0.01, *** Significant at 0.001
of Twitter adoption on political misalignment across the states. Among the 50 states,
Mississippi had the lowest per capita Twitter usage score. Massachusetts had the
highest per capita Twitter usage score. Since this data is at state level, I averaged
the district level political misalignments for each state and then ran a regression
model with state-level political misalignment as the dependent variable and Twitter
usage and control variables11 as the regressors. The coefficient for Twitter usage was
Compare-Infographic.aspx which represents a transformed measure for overall Twitter usage per
capita for each state. The data in this source is based on the overall Twitter usage in 2010.
11Constituents’ scores, household income, unemployment rate, and % highschool graduates were
used as control variables.
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-0.039 (p<0.001), revealing that the political misalignment is smaller in states where
Twitter is used more. This finding confirms the prior findings about the role of Twitter
adoption on political misalignment.
1.5.2 Addressing the Bias due to Serial Correlation
Since the Difference-in-Difference (DD) coefficients in this study rely on many
month of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes, the estimated standard
errors may be serially correlated. This is especially problematic because the adoption
of Twitter across Representatives is itself serially correlated, which will exacerbate the
bias in standard errors. To address this problem I employ the following two methods:
1.5.2.1 Ignoring Time Series Information
According to (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004), collapsing the time
series information into a “pre” and “post” period produces consistent standard
errors and is an effective correction for the inconsistent standard errors due
to serially correlated outcomes. To construct collapse voting orientation, I
calculate Representative i’s simple average voting orientation before the adop-
tion (yprei ) and after the adoption (y
post
i ). Similarly, I obtain the value for
the political misalignment before the adoption (yprei ) and after the adoption
(ypi ost)bytakingthesimpleaverageofpoliticalmisalignmentbeforeandafteradoption.AccordingtoTable9, theresultsinbothmodelsconfirmthepreviousfindings.TheimpactofTwitteradoptiononmeanvotingorientationispositiveandsignificant(0.071pointsincreaseinmeanvotingorientation)anditsimpactonmeanpoliticalmisalignmentisnegativeandsignificant(almost0.040pointsdecreaseinmisalignment).
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Table 9. Impact of Twitter on Mean voting orientation and Mean political
misalignment
Note 1 : Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
*** Significant at 0.001
1.5.2.2 Randomization Inference
Another way to address serial correlation is to employ a randomization inference
method (Bertrand et al. 2004). In this approach to compute the standard error
for a specific experiment, the difference-in-difference estimates for a large number of
randomly generated placebo laws are estimated first. Then the empirical distribution
of the estimated effects for these placebo laws are used to form significance test for the
true law. In this case, I start with estimating the difference-in-difference estimate (β2
in specification 1.1) using the observed data. The next step is to generate the placebo
data for many times and run the model in specification 1.1 on this placebo data. I
decided to create 10,000 placebo data sets. To create each placebo data, I randomly
draw 204 Representatives12 from all of the Representatives in this data and allow
12Since there are 204 actual Representatives who adopted Twitter during 111th Congress, I
matched that in this simulation to create the placebo data.
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each of them to randomly pick a month to adopt Twitter. I then run a model with
specification 1.1 on this placebo data and obtain the difference-in-difference coefficient.
Repeating this procedure for 10,000 times results in 10,000 difference-in-difference
estimates.13 The next step is to compare the actual difference-in-difference estimate
in the first step with the distribution of the placebo estimates. I set the significance
level at 0.05. To form a two-tailed test of level 0.05, I identify the placebo difference-
in-difference estimates at the 0.025 lower and upper tail of the distribution and use
these values as cutoffs: If the actual difference-in-difference estimate lies outside these
two cut-off values, I reject the hypothesis that it is equal to 0, otherwise I accept it.
Table 10 reports the results of this procedure for both voting orientation and political
misalignment.
Table 10. Randomization Inference Results with 10,000 simulations
According to Table 10, both actual difference-in-difference estimates for voting
orientation and political misalignment lie outside 95% distribution of the placebo
estimates. For voting orientation, the actual difference-in-difference estimate is larger
than the upper bound. That is, the effect of adoption on voting orientation is positive
13To perform Randomization Inference with Temporal Dependencies, I wrote a script in R. The
code will be available from the corresponding author upon request.
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and significant at 0.05. For political misalignment, the actual difference-in-difference
estimate is smaller than the lower bound. That is, the effect of adoption on political
misalignment is negative and significant at 0.05. The results in Table 10 confirms
the previous results about the effects of Twitter adoption on voting orientation and
political misalignment.
1.5.3 Representative-specific & Constituent-specific Effects
To elaborate more on the effect of Twitter adoption on Representatives’ voting
orientation and political misalignment, I introduced the Representative-specific and
constituent-specific factors as moderators to this model in Specification 1.1. Table 11,
summarizes the effects of these factors on the relationship between Twitter adoption
and voting orientation and political misalignment. The most interesting finding is the
effect of Representative-constituent party match. Representative-constituent party
match takes the value of 1 if Representative i’s party affiliation matches with the
constituent’s party affiliation, and 0 otherwise. According to Table 11, those Repre-
sentatives who represent an opposing party’s district use Twitter more effectively to
get closer to their constituents. Their political misalignment reduces slightly above
2.6 times more than that of the other Representatives whose party affiliation matches
their constituent’s party affiliation. In other words, a Republican Representative who
is elected in a Democrat district or a Democrat Representative who is elected in a
Republican district uses Twitter to reduce the misalignment with their constituents
more so than Representatives who represent their own party district. This could be
due to the fact that these Representatives feel more pressure from the constituent
and are more sensitive to what they share on Twitter. I also found that Democrat
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Representatives’ voting orientation scores increase more than their Republican peers
after joining Twitter. Democrats, however, get closer to the constituents as they join
Twitter more than Republicans do. Age, seniority, and sponsorship did not impact
the relationship between adoption and Voting orientation or misalignment. Those
representatives who co-sponsored more bills during the 111th Congress became more
conservative after joining Twitter. Co-sponsorship does not influence the effect of
Twitter adoption on political misalignment. The number of bills missed by Repre-
sentatives is associated with neither voting orientation nor political misalignment.
Those Representatives who follow their Party in voting in Congress more than others,
tend to become further conservative after joining Twitter. The literacy level of the
constituent seems to be negatively related to shifting toward conservatism. Yet, does
not have any effect on political misalignment. Surprisingly, in districts were the
average household income is higher, the adoption of Twitter by Representative is less
impactful in moving closer to the constituent. Unemployment rate in Congressional
district does not influence the effect of Twitter adoption on political misalignment.
1.6 Discussion
Social network theory suggests that a social network user’s initial opinion or
behavioral assessment might change due to the information obtained from the OSNs
(Friedkin, 1998). Furthermore, by communicating and interacting with one another,
people create social inuences that affect their opinions, attitudes, and behaviors (Fang,
Hu, Li, & Tsai, 2013; Iyengar, Van den Bult, & Valente, 2011). For politicians,
an online social network such as Twitter allows them to better interact with their
constituents. After all, politicians are representing their constituents and need to
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Table 11. The Effects of Moderating Factors on Voting orientation and political
misalignment
Note 1 : FE specification is used in all of the models. I interacted each factor with
twitter status in Specification 1.1.
Note 2 : N means no significant effect, + and – are the sign of the coefficient for the
interaction term. + for voting orientation means that the Representative became
more conservative; for political misalignment it means that the Representative further
deviated from the constituent. - for voting orientation means that the Representative
became less conservative; for political misalignment it means that the Representative
became more aligned with the constituent.
Note 3 : Almost in 18% of the districts the affiliation of the Representative was
different from constituent. Overall, 41% of the Representatives were Republican.
Descriptions and summary statistics of other variables are provided in table 2.
be familiar with their political preferences when making decisions in the Congress.
Since OSNs enable citizens to share their political views and preferences and the
issues they face in their communities, these platforms contain useful information for
politicians. Although Twitter data is public and available to everyone, politicians who
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create their account and actively engage in Twitter would have a higher chance of
observing citizens’ discussions on Twitter. More importantly, politicians’ activity on
Twitter may cause social and political mobility among the constituents. According to
Bond et al. (2012), based on a study of millions of Facebook users on 2010 Election
Day, political messages in OSNs have a measurable effect on political self-expression,
information seeking and real-world voting behavior of millions of people. Furthermore,
the messages not only influenced the users who received them but also the users’
friends, and friends of friends. Politicians, by engaging in online discussions in OSN
platforms, can inform the citizens about their own political stances and their peers’
activities in the Congress. This direct and convenient way of communication with
its broad reach was not available to the politicians before the proliferation of OSNs.
OSNs provide the politicians with a new channel that not only keeps the town hall
attenders engaged, but also reaches out to less-politically active citizens and mobilize
them.
Furthermore, according to tables 5 and 6, not only being present on Twitter
would be influential in voting orientation and political misalignment, but also the
extent to which the Representatives (Table 5) and constituents (Table 6) use Twitter
for political communication would be influential in voting orientation and political
misalignment. In this perspective, OSNs can provide politicians with information
about less politically-active constituents and therefore a more representative sample
of the constituents and their preferences. Due to these effects of OSN platforms on
political involvement, as evidenced by the results, the adoption of OSNs by politicians
may help them to be further aligned with their constituents. Figure 5 provides a good
example of this effect.
According to Figure 5, which is based on Representative Stephanie Sandlin (D-SD
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Figure 5. Changes in voting orientation of Representative Stephanie Sandlin (D-SD 1)
1) and her constituent’s political ideology, Representative Sandlin was far away from
the constituent before adopting Twitter. After the adoption, her voting orientation
moved closer to the political ideology of her constituent.
In this study I also find that Representatives’ presence in Twitter platform directs
them toward the conservative side of the voting orientation spectrum. At the same
time, their voting orientations become more aligned with their constituents. Figure
6 shows the before and after change in Representatives’ voting orientations relative
to their constituents’ political preferences. It shows that, although the politicians
became more conservative after the adoption, their average voting orientation has
shifted toward the middle of the spectrum, which signals a more moderate voting
orientation after the adoption. The comparison between the mean voting orientation
of the constituents with that of the adopters shows that the Representatives who
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Figure 6. The Impact of Twitter Adoption on Voting orientation of Representatives
Who Joined Twitter during The 111th Congress (The dashed line represents the
political ideology of adopters’ constituents).
adopted Twitter during the 111th Congress moved closer to their constituents in terms
of voting orientation.
It is worth mentioning that although I do not have an estimate for political ideology
of Twitter users, studies show that Americans at large deviated from liberalism and
became more conservative during the time period of The 111th Congress (Bartels,
2013; STIMSON, 2013). Figure 7 shows the trend of the conservatism policy mood
among Americans since 1950. According to this plot, Americans’ conservative policy
mood was on the rise during the time period of The 111th Congress. This is in line
with the data set that shows a higher conservatism in Congressional districts during
The 111th Congress.
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Figure 7. Americans’ Conservative Policy Mood (Bartels, 2013)
1.7 Conclusion and Limitations
Previous studies suggest that online social networking has caused numerous societal,
economic, and cultural changes. However, the impact of online social media on politics
and policy making has not been adequately tapped. To study the impact of online
social media on the voting behavior of politicians, I constructed a panel data for 445
Members of the 111th U.S. House of Representatives across a period of 24 months
using three disparate datasets. I collected Representatives’ data including their voting
records, Twitter data, and the constituents’ data. Using fixed effects and difference-
in-difference approaches, the analysis revealed that the adoption of Twitter by directs
them toward the conservative side of political spectrum. Furthermore, I found that the
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adoption of Twitter by Representatives helps them to get closer to the political ideology
of their constituents and therefore better represent them in Capitol Hill. Although
the underlying mechanism of influence of Twitter adoption on voting orientation and
political misalignment are not studied in this chapter and this shall be regarded as a
limitation of this study, I suggest that the use of the new media by politicians and
constituents may have a two-folded effect:
1. Effect of politicians on constituents: Using these platforms, the politicians
could inform the constituents about their political undertakings in Capitol
Hill. Although the majority of the politicians could also use traditional forms of
media (such as national and local media and town hall meetings) to communicate
with the public, those who use OSN platforms would also get the chance to
communicate with those citizens who do not use traditional media as sources of
information. As Senator Josh Stein (D- NC) put it: “[social media] is a great
way for people who don’t have the time to be able to spend following the ins
and outs of issues and legislative battles to get a quick first-person account of
what’s been going on in the legislature and state government.” (Jeffries, 2014)
Moreover, the politicians’ engagement in OSNs could mobilize the town hall
attenders even further by giving them the opportunity to openly discuss their
views on local, national, and international issues.
2. Effect of constituents on politicians: With the use of OSNs, the constituents
could initiate dialogue with their Representatives and let them know about their
social and political preferences. The transparency and broad reach of OSNs
would encourage the constituents to conveniently and publicly discuss the issues
with their Representatives. That is, requests directed at politicians through
OSN platforms are public and available to other members of the community.
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The traditional media (e.g. phone calls, town hall meetings, and letters) would
not have the same transparency or broad reach. The transparency and broad
reach of the OSNs may also motivate other citizens (or local and national media)
to join the petitions. The politically involved citizens who engage in town hall
meetings and communicate with their Representatives through traditional media
such as phone calls and letters, would find OSN platforms useful in mobilizing
less-politically active citizens to influence the politicians even further. There are
thousands of social media campaigns organized by voters who demand a specific
vote on a bill or propose new bills to Representatives.
Overall, OSN platforms provide the constituents with a convenient channel to be
heard by the politicians. Particularly, those constituents who are not politically active
(i.e. those who don’t attend the town hall meetings and do not follow the news in the
local and national media) would be mobilized by the Representatives and politically
active constituents through OSN.14
Another limitation of this study is related to the sample. U.S. Representatives are
elite politicians whose decision making in politics would differ from regular citizens.
Thus, generalizability of these findings could be limited. I also note that the similarity
of the names between some of the Representatives and other users could distort the
accuracy of name-mention tweets collected from Twitter. As a cross check, I created a
14In a separate study I found that Representatives who adopted Twitter by the end of The 111th
Congress had a higher chance for being re-elected in The 112th Congress. I studied the impact of
Representatives’ social media adoption on the results of the next election by collecting data about
Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube adoptions by Representatives. After controlling for a number of
Representative-specific and constituent-specific factors, I found that Twitter and Facebook adoption
are positively associated with the probability of Representative being elected for the next term.
Youtube adoption however, did not yield any significant results. The results of this study will be
reported and discussed in a separate paper.
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Figure 8. A Tweet Addressed to John Carter (R- TX 31)
list of Representatives with common names (for instance Jim Cooper and Mike Ross)
and checked the correlation between name-mention tweets and handle-mention tweets
for these Representatives. I observed a very high correlation between the two signaling
a potential high accuracy for name-mention tweets.
Another limitation with regard to name-mention tweets and handle-mention tweets
is that I don’t know if these tweets were sent by the constituents. However, I argue
that this information is not available to the Representatives for the most part. I
also recognize that, if available, the Representatives may weigh the tweets posted
by their own constituents more than other tweets. Last but not least, a dynamic
monthly measure for constituents’ political ideology could have helped us to construct
a more accurate measure for political misalignment. However, to my best knowledge,
all of the measures developed for constituents’ voting orientation are for four years
or longer time periods, as these measures are developed, at least partly, based on
the presidential elections data or national survey data administered over the years
(Kernell, 2009; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2013).
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To better extend the realm of this research, one may study the dynamic network
of politicians in social media. Such network can be built based on friendships or
conversations in online social networking platforms. A dynamic network analysis
may shed more light on the underlying mechanism that causes the change in voting
orientation. Moreover, I only extracted and analyzed data from Twitter platform
due to its popularity in political domain. A good extension of this study would be
studying the impact of adoption of other OSN platforms by politicians on their voting
orientation. Although Twitter is sometimes perceived as a broadcasting medium
rather than a social network, it shares certain features with other OSN platforms.
For instance, Twitter enables the users to follow and be followed by others. Or, a
Twitter user only receives the tweets from her following list on her home page. While
some users might decide to only broadcast their own ideas, prior studies show that
Twitter users read tweets posted by people they follow. For instance, a study by Liu
and colleagues (2014) shows that during The 111th Congress (from January 2009
to December 2010), more than 30% of the posts on Twitter were either replies or
retweets. Twitter also recommends out-of-network users based on the current network
of followers/ followings. Replicating this study in other OSN platforms with a different
set of features may enable the researchers to examine information-richness of the
networks and thus elaborate on the mechanisms of influence on greater detail.
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Chapter 2
DOES TWITTER MAKE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES MORE POLARIZED?
Based on repeated expressions and peer influence literature, I examine the impact
of elite politicians’ online social networking behaviors on their partisanship behavior.
I constructed a panel data for 414 Members of The 113th U.S. House of Representa-
tives across a period of 9 months. To construct this panel, data from Twitter.com,
The Library of Congress (THOMAS), The U.S. Census Bureau, voteview.com, and
cookpolitical.com were collected. First, the findings suggest that repeated postings
of party-preferred political tweets by Representatives increases the level of partisan-
ship behavior by them. Second, following peers who frequently post party-preferred
political tweets increases representatives’ partisanship behavior. Third, the effect of
following friends who frequently post party-preferred political tweets is larger than the
effect of frequent postings of party-preferred tweets by Representatives themselves.
Keywords: Online Social Networking, Ideological Polarization, U.S. House of
Representatives, Repeated Expressions, Peer Influence
2.1 Introduction
Online social network (OSN) platforms provide convenient conduits for individuals
to express their opinions, interests, and viewpoints and interact with others. Politicians
widely employ OSN platforms as an informal channel through which they express their
opinions and standpoints. They also use these channels to hear the voices of peers
and constituents in a convenient way. Numerous Washington Post, Time Magazine,
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NY Times, and Economist articles report about the extensive use of OSNs, especially
Twitter, by politicians (Hicks, 2014; Parker, 2014; Rojas, 2013; Scherer, 2009). A study
by Greenberg (2012) revealed that nearly 98% of the Representatives are active users
of OSN platforms. Moreover, the analysis of the content generated by Representatives
revealed that the majority of them are position-taking posts.
Although social media content has been studied for understanding the opinions
of the general public and consumers regarding social events, political movements,
company strategies, marketing campaigns, and product preferences (Bertot, Jaeger, &
Grimes, 2010; Chen, Chiang, & Storey, 2012; Edvardsson, Tronvoll, & Gruber, 2011;
Linders, 2012; Pang & Lee, 2008), little is known about the impact of OSN activities
on politicians’ decision making and their partisanship behavior. Given the abundant
use of OSN platforms by politicians, and an ever increasing partisanship behavior
observed in recent years in The U.S. House of Representatives, studying the potential
effects of OSN activities on politicians seems urgent. Particularly, the two dominant
perspectives about the influence of OSN platforms on partisanship behavior propose
different predictions; in one perspective the proliferation of OSNs enables the users
to be exposed to a broad range of opinions, attitudes, or even cultures and therefore
develop a shared understanding with other users (Cairncross 1997; Friedman 2005).
In the second perspective, velocity, volume, and variety of the content available on
OSNs make users behave selectively in finding their OSN collaborators and narrow
down their online interactions with like-minded users. Such effect in turn may create
further partisanship behavior (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Sunstein,
2001, 2007a).
Therefore, I intend to study the impact of OSN activities of political elites on their
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voting behavior and the underlying theories behind this relationship. More specifically,
I try to answer the following questions:
1. Do Representatives’ OSN activities make them more ideological moderate or
polarized?
2. How do OSN activities of Representatives’ friends influence Representatives’
ideological orientation?
This study could contribute to the IS research in three distinct ways:
First, this research evaluates two mechanisms of polarization; one based on repeated
expressions literature (Binder, Dalrymple, Brossard, & Scheufele, 2009; M Brauer,
Judd, & Gliner, 1995; Markus Brauer & Judd, 1996; Downing, Judd, & Brauer, 1992;
Fazio & Williams, 1986; Powell & Fazio, 1984) and another based on peer influence
literature (Axelrod, 1997; Godinho de Matos, Ferreira, & Krackhardt, 2014; Jackson
& Dunia, 2012; Sunstein, 2001; Sykes, Venkatesh, & Gosain, 2009; Van Alstyne &
Brynjolfsson, 2005; Y. Wang, Meister, & Gray, 2013). Although the latter has been
studied in OSN context, the potential effect of repeated expressions in polarization
yet to be studied.
Second, this unique dataset would enable us to compare the effects of the two
mechanisms on ideological polarization. This would further shed light on the underlying
relationships between use of OSNs and decision-making processes.
Third, the study deviates from previous studies since I evaluate the role of OSN
use by elite politicians as subject matter experts rather than normal users. This
would inform the understanding of changes in behaviors of elite experts due to their
involvement with OSNs.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, I review
the theoretical background of ideological polarization and the influence of OSN on
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ideological polarization. In section 3, I present the data and variables. In section 4,
I describe the empirical model. In Section 5, I present descriptive statistics along
with the results of the analyses. In the subsequent sections, I discuss the findings and
conclude with limitations and potential extensions of this study.
2.2 Theoretical Background
2.2.1 The Causes of Political Polarization
The evolution of American party polarization over time has been studied thoroughly
in the literature. Polarization in this area is interpreted as the ideological difference
between Democrats and Republicans. The research in this area reveals that the two
major parties were being converged until mid-70s. After that, an ever-increasing
gap between two parties has been emerging. That is, Republicans have been moving
further toward the conservative perspective while Democrats have further become
liberal (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2008).
The political science research has rigorously addressed the major causes of political
polarization in American policy making. Layman et al. (2006) studied the causes of
party polarization in the U.S. Congress. Disagreements on critical issues and cultural
and moral concerns, as Layman et al. (2006) maintained, are the major causes of
party polarization in U.S. politics. Carmines & Stimson (1989) argued that during
60s and 70s civil right movements and the dramatic differences between Democrats
and Republicans initiated the ever increasing American political polarization. The
term “issue evolution” coined by Carmines & Stimson (1989) refers to the polarization
as a result of differences between Democrats and Republicans with regard to a set
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of important issues. Other issues that triggered party polarization were related to
cultural and moral concerns. Among them, one may include abortion, homosexual
rights and school payers (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). In a sense, some of the
researchers in this area believe that critical issues, cultural, and moral concerns trigger
polarization in U.S. politics.
However, other researchers such as Cass R. Sunstein (2007a), Giovanni Sartori
(2005), and Robert Axelrod (1997) argue that polarization could be an inevitable
phenomenon when a set of society’s attributes reach to certain points. This perspective
believes that the structure of the society and the principle of homophily (the tendency
of individuals to associate with others similar to themselves) majorly cause ideological
polarization (Axelrod, 1997). One of the most influential studies in this domain
was done by Axelrod (1997). He employed adaptive agent-based modeling to study
the dissemination of culture and the ideological polarization in societies over time.
Axelrod’s model reveals how interactions of agents (individuals) could result in
ideological polarization in the society. He suggests that agents’ interactions tend to
be more frequent and influential when the agents share a set of attributes with each
other. As Rogers (1983) stated based on Homans’ The Human Group seminal work,
“The transfer of ideas occurs most frequently between individuals . . . who are similar
in certain attributes such as beliefs, education, social status, and the like.” (p. 278) In
this perspective, the principle of homophily is one of the main drivers of ideological
polarization. That is, like-minded individuals tend to interact with each other more
frequently and more influentially. Therefore, they become even more similar over time
and form groups. The similarity between the individuals within a group separates
them from other groups. As Sunstein (2007a) suggested, group polarization increases
when people have a shared sense of identity. Especially in cases that group members
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argue against another group, they tend to reveal more extreme opinions. In this sense,
homophily contributes to polarization.
In a more holistic way, Sunstein (2007a) categorizes the causes of ideological
polarization in three cohorts: the most important driver of polarization is related to
informational influence. Sunstein argues that initial seeds of all groups are biased.
This inclination attracts like-minded people to the group. As members listen to the
discussions, they tend to lean more toward the initial inclination of the seed. Hence,
extreme point of view is the result of the discussions of similar-minded group members
over time. The second cohort is related to social comparison. I like to be liked. What
I say is sometimes a function of what I want to be perceived from us by other people
(particularly people who are important to us). If others value leaning toward an
extreme opinion, group members may become more leaned toward that extreme to
obtain more credit from others. The third cohort is related to confidence. “Agreements
from others tend to increase confidence.” (Sunstein, 2007a) More confidence in turn
may make people more extreme.
Sartori’s perspective on polarization is quite simple. He argues that depending
on the size of a group and the context, the group members’ point of view is not a
unique point. Instead, it is a spectrum with a mean in the center. He maintains, since
the center opinion in the group is already occupied, a new group member or a group
member who seeks a better status in the group tends to take extreme positions within
the spectrum to attract others. Repetition of this mechanism by new members joining
the group over time gradually changes the average of the group toward an extreme
point of view (Sartori, 2005).
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2.2.2 Online Social Networks and Political Polarization
The proliferation of OSNs minimizes the cost of communication and enables the
users to reach out other individuals with a variety of backgrounds. Therefore, OSN
users could be exposed to a broad range of opinions, attitudes, or even cultures. This
in turn may create a shared understanding among OSN users and discount their
ideological differences (Cairncross, 1997; Friedman, 2005). On the other hand, velocity,
volume, and variety of the content available on OSNs make users behave selectively
in finding their OSN collaborators due to their bounded processing capacities. In
other words, users tend to create filters through which they mostly receive signals
aligned with their prior viewpoints (Sunstein 2001) and mostly interact with similar-
minded folks (Gu et al., 2014; McPherson et al., 2001). Due to this, Flache & Macy
(2006) argue that the emergence of homophily in OSNs is inevitable. Interaction with
similar-minded people may in turn reinforce partisanship behaviors as opposed to
nurturing the diversity of ideas (Axelrod, 1997; Sunstein, 2007a). As Van Alstyne and
Brynjolfsson (2005) noted “[i]nternet users can seek out interactions with like-minded
individuals who have similar values and, thus, become less likely to trust important
decisions to people whose values differ from their own. This voluntary balkanization
and the loss of shared experiences and values may be harmful to the structure of
democratic societies as well as decentralized organizations.” (p. 866)
Sunstein (2001) argues that internet technology enabled people to easily filter
what they want to see, hear, or read. Nowadays, everyone is able to design her own
newspaper, magazine, and TV channels. For instance, if someone is interested in a
certain point of view in politics, she may restrict herself to hear only from people with
the same perspective. “With the reduced importance of general interest in magazine
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and newspaper, and the flowering of individual programming design, different groups
make fundamentally different choices.” (Sunstein, 2001: p5) As Sunstein maintains,
with the unlimited power of filtering, individuals can create their own communication
universe. Customization features available in many online media further strengthens
self-filtering phenomenon. Many websites can choose whatweare interested in just by
knowing a little about us and our taste (Sunstein, 2007b). These websites then can
suggest recommendations based on the tastes of like-minded people. This in turn may
further promote the homophily within the group of similar-minded individuals and
subsequently elevate ideological polarization. It is worth noting that the impact of
homophily, and the subsequent peer influence, on network users has been extensively
researched in IS and other disciplines. A substantial number of these studies examined
the impact of peer influence on technology use, online product ratings, and decision
making (El-Shinnawy and Vinze 1998; Godinho de Matos et al. 2014; Sykes et
al. 2009; Wang et al. 2013; Wattal et al. 2010). Others studied the role of peer
influence in dissemination of ideas and cultures (Jackson & Dunia, 2012), and stock
market participation (Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, & Weisbenner, 2008). This perspective
hinges around the influence of peers on group members’ decisions. However, not only
OSNs facilitate the communications among peers, but also they provide conduits for
individuals to repeatedly express their opinions. According to Powell & Fazio (1984),
repeated attitude expressions increase the accessibility of the attitude. Increases in
accessibility in turn lead to greater attitude–behavior consistency (Fazio & Williams,
1986). Drawing from Fazio’s studies, Downing et al. (1992) proposed that repeated
expressions are at least partly responsible for attitude extremity. This proposition
was further studied and supported by Brauer et al. (1995). Particularly, another
study by Binder et al. (2009) based on data from a nationwide mail panel survey
48
carried out between 2002 and 2005 revealed that political talk plays a substantial
role in shaping and polarizing attitudes on a given issue; discussions in networks
composed of like-minded others directly lead to the development of extreme attitudes.
As Brauer & Judd (1996) concluded, the social psychology literature suggests that
“individuals polarize in group discussions in part because they frequently express their
own opinions and arguments as well as listen to the arguments and opinions of other
group members.” (p. 203) According to this statement, there are two effects that could
contribute to polarization: 1- repeated expressions of own opinions, and 2- listening
to the arguments of other group members (peer influence). If we suppose that the
Democrats shape one group and the Republicans shape another group, within-group
political discussions could result in political polarization. Therefore, I hypothesize
that:
H1: Repeated expressions of party-preferred political opinions through twitter
increase ideological polarization of the Representatives.
H2: Following peers who post party-preferred political tweets on Twitter increases
ideological polarization of the Representatives.
2.3 Data & Variables
2.3.1 Twitter Data
Using scripts in Python programming language, I collected data from Twitter
API since September 21st, 2013 to May 31st, 2014. The data set contains 184,476
tweets posted by Members of the 113th House of Representatives. From this dataset, I
excluded the tweets posted before the time span of this study. This resulted in 154,534
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tweets posted by Representatives during the calendar months August 2013 to May
2014. Moreover, I collected the list of followers and followings for each Representative
at the end of each month during the time span of the study.
Since the content of the tweets vary, they may not have the same impact on political
polarization of the Representatives. For instance, some of the tweets may be quite
personal while others may reveal important opinions of the Representative. Moreover,
some of the tweets are in line with the political orientation of Representative’s party
while some other might be against the proposed position of the party. To extract
politically relevant tweets posted by Representatives, the literature suggests a coding
procedure (Greenberg, 2012). In this procedure, each tweet will be coded based on
sentiment, reference to the party, and purpose. Based on purpose, a tweet can be
classified into the following categories: 1- campaign-related tweets, 2- tweets about
official congressional actions, 3- position taking tweets, 4- policy statement tweets
5- district or state related tweets 6- media or public relations tweets, 7- personal
tweets, and 8- others. Table 12 represents a snapshot of the output of the coding
procedure. According to table 12, Representative Kevin Brady tweeted a negative
opinion about the opposing party. In contrast, Representative George Miller posted a
positive tweet in favor of his own party. Since both of these tweets are admired by
the Representative’s own party, I call these tweets party-preferred tweets. Therefore
a party-preferred tweet is a tweet with a positive sentiment about Representative’s
allied party, or a negative tweet about Representative’s opposing party.
Given the size of the data set, manual coding of the tweets could be challenging.
Therefore, I employed text mining techniques to detect party-preferred tweets posted
by Representatives. To do so, I initially set up three training data sets for each
classification task. I hired two independent coders who read and classified 7,727 tweets
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Table 12. Snapshot of the Output of the Proposed Coding Procedure
(5% of all of the tweets) based on purpose, sentiment, and reference. It is worth noting
that each coder was provided with the same manual consisting of the guidelines for
coding the tweets as well as numerous examples of manually coded tweets by the
authors. Cohen’s Kappa for sentiment, reference, and purpose categorizations were
0.841, 0.813, and 0.802 respectively, signaling an almost perfect agreement between
coders (Hallgren, 2012). In case of disagreements, a third coder made the final decision.
As mentioned earlier, there were 8 different categories for purpose. Not all of these
categories have the same political weight. Therefore, I had to remove the tweets
that are not positioned politically. For instance, campaign-related tweets, media or
public relations tweets, and personal tweets don’t have the same political weight that
position taking and policy statement tweets yield. For this reason, I created two
groups of tweets based on purpose: 1- Relevant tweets: all of the tweets categorized
in official congressional actions, position taking, and policy statement fall into this
group. 2- Irrelevant tweets: all of the tweets categorized in campaign-related, district
or state related, media or public relations, personal, and others fall into this group.
To construct the regressors in the econometric model, I only used relevant tweets.
To identify the relevant tweets, I trained the machine learning classifier to separate
relevant and irrelevant tweets. I used 3,779 manually coded irrelevant tweets and 3,948
manually coded relevant tweets to train a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier in
RapidMiner version 5 (Jungermann, 2009). I employed polynomial kernel type set at
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2.0 kernel degree and 200 cache. The convergence epsilon was set at 0.001 and the
maximum iterations was set at 100,000. To create the word vectors, I used TF-IDF
with percentual prune method. Prune below was set at 1% and prune above was set
at 98%. Table 13 reports the accuracy of this classifier measured by cross-validation
method with 10 folds. The overall accuracy is the percentage of total tweets classified
correctly (as relevant or irrelevant). Class-level recall is the percentage of tweets
associated with a particular class that were classified as such. For example, relevant
recall is the percentage of all relevant tweets in the test bed that are classified as
relevant. Figure 2 illustrates the training process performed in RapidMiner to train
the classifiers. Using this classifier, I separated 100,005 irrelevant tweets from 54,529
relevant tweets.
Table 13. Purpose Analysis Accuracy
The next step is to identify the sentiment and the reference of the relevant tweets.
To identify the sentiment of each tweet, I set up a training data set from the repository
of manually coded tweets. I created a negative class consisting of 1,920 negative tweets,
and a positive class including 994 positive tweets. I adopted the same algorithm
that I used to detect relevant tweets to train and classify the tweets based on their
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sentiment. Only this time I used SVM with dot kernel type with 200 kernel cache.
The convergence epsilon was again set at 0.001 and the maximum iterations was
set at 100,000. To create the word vectors, I used TF-IDF with percentual prune
method. Prune below was set at 3% and prune above was set at 95%. This resulted
in identifying 39,935 negative tweets and 14,594 positive tweets. Table 14 reports the
accuracy of this classifier. It is worth mentioning that this accuracy is higher than the
average accuracy reported for Twitter sentiment analysis performed by RapidMiner
(Abbasi, Hassan, & Dhar, 2014). There could be two reasons for this higher accuracy:
1- Before performing sentiment analysis, I removed the irrelevant tweets from the
data set. The remainder are tweets about position taking, policy making, and official
congressional actions. This process resembles Pang and Lee’s (2004) approach and
would result in a more refined Twitter data set for sentiment and reference analysis.
2- All of the tweets in the data set are posted by politicians who are subject matter
experts and may use similar terminologies in their posts.
Table 14. Sentiment Analysis Accuracy
To identify the reference of each tweet with regard to the political party, I set up
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Figure 9. Classifier Training Process
another training data set from the repository of manually coded tweets. I created a
Democrats class consisting of 1,240 tweets that referred to the Democrats political
party, and a Republicans class including 1,289 tweets referring to the Republican
political party. I adopted the same algorithm that I used in purpose analysis to train
and classify the tweets based on their reference. Table 15 reports the accuracy of this
classifier. Although I also attempted hashtag co-occurrence approach as described
in (Conover et al., 2011) to detect the political reference of the tweets, the accuracy
achieved by the classifier was higher. Figure 3 summarized the text mining approach
to extract the relevance, sentiment, and reference of each tweet.
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Table 15. Reference Analysis Accuracy
After identifying the reference of the tweet with regard to the political party, I had
to identify whether the tweet is referring to the Representative’s allied party or the
opposing party. To do so, I compared the political party of the Representative who
posted the tweet with the reference of the tweet using a script in Python. I created a
dummy variable that takes the value of zero if the tweet is about the opposing party,
and 1 if the tweet refers to the allied party. It is worth noting that the joint accuracy
of detecting party-preferred tweets was 73.29
The last step is to construct the variable called Preferred_Tweets. This variable
was constructed by summing the number of positive tweets with reference to the allied
party and negative tweets with reference to the opposing party for each month. For
instance, if Representative i posts 2 negative tweets about the opposing party and 4
positive tweets about his own party during time period t, the value of Preferred_Tweets
variable for him for time period t will be 6.
To be able to test the second hypothesis, I needed to construct another variable that
captures the effect of connecting to friends who post Preferred_Tweets. Each Twitter
user is fed only by the tweets posted by users she follows on Twitter or sponsored
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Figure 10. Text Mining Process
tweets by advertisers. Therefore, it seems to be fair to assume that Representatives
are impacted, if any, only by tweeting activities of people they follow on Twitter.
Based on the data though, Representatives follow an average of 4,123 users on Twitter
and it seems impossible for a Representative to read all of the tweets posted by his
Twitter friends. Therefore, I narrow down the friends list to those friends who are also
serving in The Congress. To construct the variable Friends_Effect I calculated the
arithmetic mean of Preferred_Tweets posted by Representative’s friends during each
month. A high value for this variable means that the Representative follows peers
who share Preferred_Tweets more frequently. In contrast, the value of this variable
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would be small if Representative’s friends are not posting Preferred_Tweets. This
approach would make Friends_Effect comparable to Preferred_Tweets.
2.3.2 Polarization Data
For each month of the study, I estimated the measure of Representatives’ ideologi-
cal polarization based on votes cast by each Representative in a given month. I used
the first dimension of Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation (WNOMINATE), a
widely used estimation model in political science, for the estimation (Poole, Lewis, Lo,
& Carroll, 2011). WNOMINATE is “a scaling procedure that performs parametric
unfolding of binary choice data.” (Poole & Rosenthal, 1985) Given a matrix of binary
choices by individuals (for example, Yea or Nay) over a series of Parliamentary votes,
WNOMINATE produces a configuration of legislators and outcome points for the Yea
and Nay alternatives for each roll call using a probabilistic model of choice. WNOMI-
NATE creates a spectrum of scores ranging from -1 to +1, with -1 representing the
most Liberal Representative and +1 representing the most Conservative Representa-
tive. The WNOMINATE scores have been employed by numerous social scientists to
study the behaviors of the politicians, mainly ideological polarization, based on their
voting records (Aldrich & Battista, 2002; Aldrich, Montgomery, & Sparks, 2014; Lupu,
2013). Since we are interested in the magnitude of the political polarization rather
than its direction, I employed the absolute value of the WNOMINATE scores as a
measure of polarization. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being the highest
level of ideological polarization (either extreme Democrat or extreme Republican) and
0 being the lowest level of ideological polarization.
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2.3.3 Constituent’s Data
I adopted Cook’s partisan voting index (PVI) developed and introduced by Charlie
Cook in 1997 as a measure of constituents’ political orientation. Cook’s PVI is a
measurement of how strongly a United States congressional district leans toward
the Democratic or Republican Party, compared to the nation as a whole. Cook
employs the last two presidential election results as a baseline for gauging the political
orientation of each congressional district (Cook & David, 2014; Nunnari, 2011). I
obtained Cook’s PVI for each congressional district during 113th Congress. Cook’s
PVI for the 113th Congress ranges from 0 to 29 for Republican districts and from
0 to 41 for Democrat districts. During the 113th Congress, New York’s 14th and
15th districts with a PVI score of D+41 were the most liberal districts while Texas’s
11th and 13th districts with a PVI of R+29 were the most conservative districts. I
rescaled Cook’s PVI to match the WNOMINATE measures. In the dataset Cook’s
PVI ranges from -1 to +1 with -1 being the score for the most liberal congressional
district and +1 being the score for the most conservative district. Again, since we are
interested in the magnitude of the political polarization rather than its direction, I
employed the absolute value of the scaled PVI scores as a measure of constituents’
political polarization. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being the highest level
of polarization (either extreme Democrat or extreme Republican district) and 0 being
the lowest level of polarization.
I also collected data from The United States Census Bureau for constituents’
internet access and voteview.com for Representatives’ party affiliation. Table 16
reports all of the sources of data for this study.
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2.4 Empirical Model
I employed a two-step empirical model:
1. Fixed effects specification to estimate the coefficients for Preferred_Tweets
and Friends_Effect. With panel data, the FE estimation procedure gives the
consistent estimates of the parameters on time-varying variables. However,
the estimation cannot identify the effects of the time-invariant variables, such
as the effect of constituent’s political polarization and party affiliation due to
the fact that all of the time-invariant variables in the model are removed in
the FE estimation procedure. Under this specification, I propose the model of
Representatives’ ideological polarization as:
yit = β0 + β1x1it−1 + β2x2it−1 + β3x3it−1 + Tt + αi + it (2.1)
Where i is the index for Representatives and t is the index for time, t = 09-2013,
10-2013, . . . , 05-2014; yit is Representative i’s ideological polarization at time
t, x1it−1 is the count of party-preferred tweets (Preferred_Tweets) posted by
Representative i at time t-1, x2it−1 is the mean of party-preferred tweets posted at
time t-1 by Representative i’s Twitter friends who serve in the Congress, x3it−1 is
the number of bills Representative i cosponsored with his/ her Twitter friends at
time t-1, T is a vector of time-fixed effects, αi is the fixed effects for Representative
i, and it is the error term. I adopted from (Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani, & Bazzi,
2012) and employed 1 month lagged Preferred_Tweets and Friends_Effect to
avoid potential simultaneous causation. Another issue to be addressed in this
model is the effects of offline interactions among the Representatives. Aside
from the online interactions, the Representatives may have significant offline
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exchanges with their colleagues. Therefore, one could argue that the offline
interactions among the Representatives are the actual drivers of the changes
in the ideological polarization and the online transactions are mere reflection
of those offline transactions. To account for the potential effects of the offline
transactions, I counted the number of times each Representative cosponsored a
bill with his/ her Twitter friends during each month of the study. The logic is
that Representatives who have higher offline interactions with each other would
cosponsor more bills together. The cosponsorship network has been rigorously
studied in the political science (Fowler, 2006a, 2006b) and has been tied to the
political polarization of the Representatives (Zhang et al., 2008).
2. Zero- One Inflated Beta Regression (ZOIB) estimation. The reason for using this
specification is that the values of the political polarization is bounded to range
from zero to one. Since the OLS specification assumes a normal distribution, the
linear specification may not work in this setting. According to (Kieschnick &
McCullough, 2003), parametric regression models based on beta distribution are
recommended for these data. Particularly, the ZOIB model has been previously
used in political science literature when WNOMINATE scores were employed
to construct the outcome variable (Burmester & Jankowski, 2014). The ZOIB
model consists of three separate regression models: 1- A logistic regression model
for whether or not the proportion equals 0, 2- a logistic regression model for
whether or not the proportion equals 1, and 3- a beta regression model for
the proportions between 0 and 1 (Buis, 2010). It is worth noting that ZOIB
specification would also allow us to introduce time-invariant repressors such as
Representatives’ demographic data and factors related to their constituents.
60
2.5 Results
Table 16 represents the descriptions, sources of the data, and summary statistics.
According to table 16, the mean of ideological polarization of the Representatives is
almost in the middle of the spectrum. However, comparing this measure with the
mean of constituents’ political polarization reveals that Representatives, on average,
are more polarized than the constituents. Table 16 also reveals that Representatives
post usually more than 5 Preferred_Tweets during each month. However, their friends
usually post one more party-preferred tweet each month.
The number of Republican Representatives in this sample (all of the Representatives
who had Twitter account during the period of this study) is slightly higher than the
count of Democrats, which is almost identical to the body of The 113th Congress as
there are 233 Republican Members and 199 Democrat Members. As discussed earlier,
constituents are less polarized than their representatives. Last but not least, more
than 76% of the constituents, on average, have access to the internet according to the
data from U.S. Census Bureau released in 2012.
Table 17 reports the results of the FE and ZOIB models, which are based on
Equation (1). For the ZOIB models, I also reported the marginal effects to be able to
compare the magnitude of the effects. According to table 17, Preferred_Tweets and
Friends_Effect are both positive and significant in all models. The control for the
offline interactions, Cosponsor_Friends, is significant and negative in the FE model
but not significant in the ZOIB model. Furthermore, the impact of Friends_Effect on
Representative_Polarization is higher than the impact of Preferred_Tweets posted
by Representatives themselves. Moreover, according to model 4 Party_Affiliation,
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Constituent_Political_Polarization, and Constituent_Internet_Access are not signifi-
cant.
Table 16. Variables, Descriptions, & Summary Statistics
To test for heteroskedasticity I exploited modified Wald test for group-wise het-
eroskedasticity in fixed effects regression model. Since I identified the presence of
heteroskedasticity, I employed Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors in all mod-
els. To decide between random and fixed effect models, I employed Hausman test.
The RE estimation procedure can estimate the parameters of all the time-varying and
time-invariant variables in the model under the assumption that all the independent
variables are independent of the fixed effects. Hence, I test for the assumption to
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decide whether the RE estimation is appropriate for the model. The result was in
favor of the fixed effect model (p<0.001). I also tested for the time-fixed effects by
a joint test to see if the dummies for all months are equal to zero. I identified the
presence of time-fixed effects. Therefore I generated time dummies to obtain the two
level fixed effects estimators in all FE models and incorporated time dummy variables
in ZOIB models to control for omitted variables that vary over time but are constant
across the units.
Table 17. FE and ZOIB Estimation Results (DV = Representative_Polarization)
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I also tested for cross-sectional dependence using Breusch-Pagan LM test of inde-
pendence and Pesaran cross-sectional dependence. Pesaran cross-sectional dependence
test is used to test whether the residuals are correlated across subjects. Cross-sectional
dependence can lead to bias in tests results (also called contemporaneous correlation).
The results of the tests did not signal the presence of cross-sectional dependence. I
further employed Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data; which signaled the
presence of serial correlation. Therefore I used clustered errors at the panel level in
models 1 and 2. If there is serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term, clustering
at the panel level will produce consistent estimates of the standard errors as discussed
in (Wooldridge 2002: p177).
2.6 Discussion
The goal was to study the potential impacts of two distinct mechanisms on
ideological polarization of an elite population. The first mechanism, is the effect of
Representatives’ own tweeting habits. The second mechanism taps the influence of
Representatives’ social media friends.
2.6.1 Representative’s Own Tweeting Habits
According to the findings in table 17, repeated expressions of party-preferred
opinions in Twitter contribute to ideological polarization. This finding is still valid if I
control for the effects of party affiliation and constituent’s characteristics. This finding
is consistent with the social psychology literature that has tapped the influence of
repeated expressions on attitude polarization in a variety of contexts. Powell & Fazio
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(1984) argue that repeated attitude expressions increase the accessibility of the attitude.
Increases in accessibility of the attitude in turn lead to greater attitude–behavior
consistency (Fazio & Williams, 1986). According to this domain of research it would
make sense that the more a user tweets in favor of a position, the more vehemently
that person will maintain his or her position. Particularly a study by Binder et al.
(2009), based on data from a nationwide mail panel survey carried out between 2002
and 2005, revealed that political talk plays a substantial role in shaping and polarizing
attitudes on a given issue; discussions in networks composed of like-minded others
directly lead to the development of extreme attitudes. As Brauer & Judd (1996)
concluded, the social psychology literature suggests that “individuals polarize in group
discussions in part because they frequently express their own opinions and arguments
as well as listen to the arguments and opinions of other group members.” This finding
about the first hypothesis suggests that Representatives who frequently post tweets
that are favorable by their allied party, tend to become more extreme over time.
2.6.2 Friends’ Effect
The second important mechanism I studied is the effects of social media friends.
According to Sunstein (2007a), there are several mechanisms that could drive ideo-
logical polarization. Informational influence however, as Sunstein argues, is the most
significant driver of ideological polarization. This cohort suggests that individuals
become more convinced of their views when they hear novel arguments in support
of their position (Vinokur & Burstein, 1974). As group members listen to the dis-
cussions, they tend to lean more toward the initial inclination that was the basis for
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group foundation. Hence, extreme point of view is the result of the discussions of
similar-minded group members over time.
To evaluate the presence of homophily in Representatives’ Twitter network, I
created the network of Representatives’ connections based on Twitter following/
follower relationships. Not surprisingly, the inter-group (party) edges in this network
are denser than the intra-group edges in this graph. Nearly 87% of the edges of this
network were among Representatives from the same party. Givan-Newman modularity
of this graph was 0.336 and the graph density is 0.216. Overall, the following/ follower
network of the Representatives indicates that a great level of homophily exists in
Representatives’ Twitter relationships.
Sunstein (2001) argues that internet technology enabled people to easily filter
what they want to see, hear, or read. Nowadays, everyone is able to design her own
newspaper, magazine, and TV channels. For instance, if someone is interested in a
certain point of view in politics, she may restrict herself to hear only from people with
the same perspective. “With the reduced importance of general interest in magazine
and newspaper, and the flowering of individual programming design, different groups
make fundamentally different choices.” (Sunstein, 2001: p5) As Sunstein maintains,
with the unlimited power of filtering, individuals can create their own communication
universe. There is no surprise that Representatives, as elite politicians, create such
universe for themselves. Customization features available in many online media
further strengthens self-filtering phenomenon. Many websites can choose what we are
interested in just by knowing a little about us and our taste (Sunstein, 2007b). These
websites then can suggest recommendations based on the tastes of like-minded people.
This in turn may further promote the homophily within the group of similar-minded
individuals and subsequently elevate ideological polarization.
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These findings in table 17 suggest that Friends_Effect is significant and positive in
all models, confirming the second hypothesis. A comparison between the coefficients of
Representative’s party-preferred tweets and Friends_Effect reveals that the influence
of friends on ideological polarization is larger than the effect of Representative’s own
tweeting habits. This finding sheds more light on the mechanisms of ideological
polarization. Friends_Effect on Representative_Polarization is still significant and
positive even when I control for the offline interactions among the Representatives by
introducing the number of bills they cosponsored with their Twitter friends.
2.7 Conclusion
By collecting all of the tweets posted by 414 Members of The 113th House of
Representatives, their voting records, party affiliation, and constituent’s data over a
9-month period I studied the impact of OSN activities on Representatives’ ideological
polarization. The body of knowledge suggests that there are at least two mechanisms
that contribute to the ideological polarization. The first mechanism relates to the
repeated expressions of opinions. Repeated expressions of attitudes escalate the
accessibility of the attitude. Increases in accessibility of the attitude, subsequently,
lead to greater attitude–behavior consistency (Fazio & Williams, 1986). These findings
suggest that this mechanism is functional in Twitter platform for elite politicians. That
is, Representatives who frequently tweet party favorable content would eventually vote
more consistent with their allied party. The second mechanism relates to the effect
of peer influence. Political discussions in networks composed of like-minded others
directly lead to the development of extreme attitudes, thus ideological polarization.
Another interesting finding of this study is that peer influence has a higher impact on
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ideological polarization than do Representatives’ own tweeting habits. Furthermore,
the analyses are based on behaviors and decisions of elite politicians who are subject-
matter experts. This deviates from prior studies in which ordinary users have been
studied.
2.8 Limitations & Future Research
One of the limitations of this study is related to the sample. U.S. Representatives
are elite politicians whose decision making in politics would differ from regular citizens.
Thus, generalizability of these findings shall be limited to the elite politician population.
To better extend the realm of this research, one may study the dynamic network of
politicians in social media. Such network can be built based on conversations in online
social networking platforms. The Twitter platform enables users to mention another
user or to retweet another user’s tweet. Therefore, dynamics networks could be created
based on the mentions and retweets among the users. A dynamic network analysis
may shed more light on the underlying mechanism that causes the change in political
orientation. Moreover, I only extracted and analyzed data from Twitter platform
due to its popularity in political domain. A good extension of this study would be
studying the impact of adoption of other social media platforms by politicians on their
political polarization. Although Twitter is sometimes perceived as a broadcasting
medium rather than a social network, it shares certain features with other online
social networking platforms. For instance, Twitter enables the users to follow and be
followed by others. Twitter also recommends out of network users based on the current
network of followers/ followings. However, replicating this study in other online social
networking platforms with different set of features may enable the researchers to
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examine information-richness of the networks and thus elaborate on the mechanism of
influence on greater detail.
Another interesting avenue for extending this research is to incorporate the OSN
activities of Representatives’ constituents. After all, Representatives are elected to
represent the opinions of their constituents. Therefore, it would be interesting to
study the impact of constituent-generated content on ideological polarization of the
constituents. Furthermore, I suggest future researchers to evaluate the impact of
constituents’ social media posts and political polarization on the tweeting habits of
their representatives.
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Chapter 3
THE EFFECTS OF HOMOPHILY IN TWITTER COMMUNICATION NETWORK
OF U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: A DYNAMIC NETWORK STUDY
By employing a recently developed dynamic network model (separable temporal
exponential-family random graph model), I study the effects of homophily based on
gender, race, and political party on formation and dissolution of Representatives’
Twitter communications in forms of mentions and retweets over a period of six month.
The results indicate the presence of demographic homophily and value homophily
in Representatives’ Twitter communications networks. More importantly, I find
that female Representatives and Representatives from minor ethnical groups have
a high tendency in forming and persisting Twitter communications with similar
Representatives. I also observe that homophily based on demographics such as gender
and race is more effective in Mentions network while homophily based on political
party is more dominant in Retweets network.
Keywords: Online Social Networking, Twitter, Dynamic Networks, Homophily,
Exponential-family Random Graph Model (ERGM), Separable Temporal ERGM.
3.1 Introduction
Homophily (the tendency of individuals to associate with others similar to them-
selves) has been reportedly identified as one of the main drivers of network formation
(Gu, Konana, Raghunathan, & Chen, 2014; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).
The majority of the previous studies treated social networks as static networks where
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the ties between the nodes are assumed to be constant and permanent. That is, the
relationships among the nodes are not allowed to change over time. However in certain
contexts such as in case of communications among social media users, the relationships
may form and dissolve over time. Furthermore even in studies where the ties are
allowed to change over time (dynamic networks), the underlying change mechanism
in the network is only allowed to be the tie formation mechanism rather than both tie
formation and tie dissolution mechanisms. Since social media users may have different
reasons for forming a tie rather than breaking an existing tie, theoretically speaking
it would be informative to allow both tie formation and tie dissolution in dynamic
networks (Krivitsky & Handcock, 2014). Such a setup would allow the researcher to
study the underlying mechanisms of the changes in dynamic networks by considering
both formation and dissolution of ties.
Therefore, I employed recently developed Separable Temporal Exponential-family
Random Graph Model (STERGM) to study the effects of homophily based on party
affiliation, gender, and race on tie formation and dissolution of U.S. House Repre-
sentatives’ online communications on Twitter. STERGM, introduced by Krivitsky
and Handcock (2014), is an extension of Exponential-family Random Graph Model
(ERGM) for modeling dynamic networks in discrete time. The cross-sectional ERGM
entails a single network, and a single model on that network. STERGM, in contrast,
posits two models: one ERGM underlying tie formation, and a second one underlying
tie dissolution. This approach is not simply a methodological development, but a
theoretical one as well. Particularly in cases where the statistical model underlying
tie formation can be different from the statistical model underlying tie dissolution
(e.g. gender homophily may turn out to be a significant driver of tie formation, but
not significant in tie dissolution) this approach would provide a proper framework for
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studying the phenomena. Therefore, I argue that STERGM model creates a unique
setting where various effects of homophily on both tie formation and tie dissolution
can be studied. This approach deviates from previous studies where either the network
was treated as static (Conover et al., 2011; Susarla, Oh, & Tan, 2011; Yardi & Boyd,
2010; Zeng & Wei, 2013), or even in case of dynamic network studies, only the tie
formation was studied and tie dissolution was either not relevant (Aral, Muchnika, &
Sundararajan, 2009; Bampo, Ewing, Mather, Stewart, & Wallace, 2008) or simply
ignored (Tarbush & Teytelboym, 2012). In this study, I intend to respond to McPher-
son et al. (2001) call for research by studying the “dynamics of network change over
time through which networks and other social entities co-evolve.”
In the followings, I start with briefly reviewing the theoretical foundation of
homophily with respect to gender, race, and political party affiliation. Next, I review
the literature of ERGM and STERGM. Then, I describe the data and present the
empirical model for studying the role of homophily in tie formation and dissolution in
Twitter communication networks of U.S. House Representatives. Next, I present the
results. Finally, I discuss the findings and conclude with the implications.
3.2 Theoretical Background
There are two major reasons for why homophily exists in social networks. First,
people are social entities who like to be liked. Since similarity could be a reason for
social bonding and belongingness feeling, more interactions with similar others may
increase the chance of being liked (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Second, people like to
feel confident by getting approvals and endorsements from others. Since it is more
likely for people to get approvals from similar others, increasing the interactions with
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similar others may increase approvals from them, thus increase confidence (Festinger,
1954).
According to McPherson et al. (2001), homophily can be based on demographic
characteristics (such as gender, and race) or values (such as political beliefs). Below, I
review the main findings of previous studies and propose several hypotheses:
3.2.1 Homophily Based on Gender
Gender homophily has been found to be present in social and professional networks
(Louch, 2000; McPherson et al., 2001). The findings of previous studies suggest that
males are more homophilous in tie formation (tend to interact with other males) than
females do (Ibarra, 1992; Kleinbaum, Stuart, & Tushman, 2011). Particularly, Ibarra
(1997) suggests that in workplace environments males show a high gender homophily
by mainly interacting with their male coworkers. However, females tend to interact
with their male peers rather than female peers to increase their chance for promotions
and better job opportunities.
The recent studies about homophily based on gender warn that to study this
phenomenon one should distinguish the professional relationships from personal
relationships. Smith et al. (2014) found that both males and females show a high
level of homophily in personal relationship networks, but females show heterophily
in workplace environments. Given that the communications among the U.S. House
Representatives can be regarded as workplace communications, I therefore propose:
H1- Gender homophily:
H1a: Ceteris paribus, both male Representatives and female Representa-
tives show a high tendency in forming Twitter communication ties with
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male Representatives over time.
H1b: Ceteris paribus, both male Representatives and female Representa-
tives show a high tendency in persisting Twitter communication ties with
male Representatives over time.
Homophily Based on Race
Race is claimed to be the biggest divide in social networks in the United States,
and is claimed to play a major role in structuring the networks in other ethnically
diverse societies as well (McPherson et al., 2001). Similar to gender homophily, race
homophily has been reported to have a twofold effect in network formation (Smith
et al., 2014): First, in cases where the network ties are created based on personal
relationships (e.g. close friendships), minorities (African Americans and Latinos)
show a higher level of homophily than do Whites (Mollica, Gray, & Treviño, 2003).
Second, in cases where the network ties are created based on professional relationships
(e.g. workplace relationships), minorities show a lower level of homophily than do
Whites (Ibarra, 1995). Similar to females, minorities in workplace tend to interact
with Whites to pave their road for better job opportunities.
Therefore I propose:
H2- Race homophily:
H2a: Ceteris paribus, both White Representatives and ethnical minorities
show a high tendency in forming Twitter communication ties with White
Representatives over time.
H2b: Ceteris paribus, both White Representatives and ethnical minorities
show a high tendency in persisting Twitter communication ties with White
Representatives over time.
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3.2.2 Homophily Based on Party Affiliation (Political Values)
Forming relationships based on political affiliation goes beyond workplace commu-
nications and can be even found in online dating relationships. For instance, a study
by Huber and Malhotra (2014) revealed that “people find those with similar political
beliefs more desirable and are more likely to match with them compared to people with
discordant opinions” in an online dating community. In another study, Halberstam
and Knight (2015) found that politically active Twitter users tend to interact with
other users with the same political views. Conover et al. (2011) and Yardi and Boyd
(2010) also found significant presence of political homophily in communication network
of Twitter users.
Therefore I propose:
H3- Political homophily:
H3a: Ceteris paribus, Representatives from the same political party show
a high tendency in forming Twitter communication ties over time.
H3b: Ceteris paribus, Representatives from the same party show a high
tendency in persisting Twitter communication ties over time.
3.2.3 Exponential-family Random Graph Model (ERGM)
The basic idea of ERGM is to find a model of a network formation process that
maximizes the likelihood of an observed network (y) being created at some point in
time in this process. Within this framework, one can obtain maximum-likelihood
estimates for the parameters of a specified model for a given data set; simulate
additional networks with the underlying probability distribution implied by that
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model; test individual models for goodness-of-fit, and perform various types of model
comparison.
The class of ERGM has been developed on the basis of a Markov chain to include
not only dyadic effects but also structural effects at the network level (Broekel,
Balland, Burger, & Van Oort, 2014). The purpose of ERGM is therefore to describe
parsimoniously the local selection forces that shape the global structure of a network
(Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008). Originally, ERGM is developed
to address the complex inter-dependencies within relational data structures and to
provide a flexible framework for these network structures (Handcock, Hunter, Butts,
Goodreau, & Morris, 2008). In other words, ERGM provides a flexible approach for
studying and incorporating observed network statistics such as degree distributions,
mutual relationships, triangles, and cycles while also including exogenous attributes
related to network vertices or even edges (ties) themselves. In ERGM framework, the
observed network statistics are being considered as outcomes, and the goal of the
model is to specify the process that leads to their joint distribution. In a nutshell,
ERGM provides a statistical framework for evaluating alternative hypotheses about
the processes that lead to the observed outcomes.
Researchers form a wide array of disciplines have employed ERGM to study the
phenomena of interest. For instance, the social science researchers have employed
ERGM to analyze the friendship networks (Goodreau, Kitts, & Morris, 2009; Lubbers
& Snijders, 2007) and international political conflicts (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011).
Although the IS research has not yet directly benefited from these models, Chen et al.
(2012) considered ERGM approach as one of the emerging research agendas in the
realm of network analytics in IS discipline.
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3.2.4 Separable Temporal ERGM (STERGM)
STERGM is an extension of ERG models for studying temporal dynamic networks.
STERGM allows the researcher to create a temporal meta-network (a collection of
cross-sectional networks over several discrete times) to study the temporal changes in
the networks over time. The cross-sectional ERGM entails a single network, and a
single model on that network. However, one of the key features of STERGM is that the
processes for network formation and network dissolution are modeled independently.
Therefore, the researcher could develop and test different hypotheses for tie formation
and tie dissolution. STERGM uses two ERGM models at each time period: 1- an
ERGM for modeling tie formation, and 2- an ERGM for modeling tie dissolution. It
is worth noting that although STERGM is a recently developed approach, it has been
employed for modeling dynamics of social interactions (Krivitsky & Handcock, 2014).
In the study, I start with an ERGM specification to study the presence of homophily
based on gender, race, and political party in Mentions and Retweets networks of U.S.
House of Representatives. Then, I employ STERGM to study the temporal changes
in these two networks over a six month period.
3.3 Data and Method
This data set includes 3,685 Mentions (Figure 11) and 1,545 Retweets (Figure 12) by
370 U.S. House Representatives over the period between August 1st, 2013 to January
31st, 2014 (six months) and data about Representatives’ party affiliation, gender,
and race. To study the presence of homophily in Twitter communication network, I
created two Twitter communication networks: Mentions network (a directed network
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Figure 11. Mentions Network of Representatives (Blue Nodes Are Democrats and
Red Nodes Are Republicans)
where a tie is created from Representative i to Representative j if Representative i
mentioned Representative j) and Retweets network (a directed network where a tie
is created from Representative i to Representative j if Representative i retweeted a
tweet by Representative j).
I estimate an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) that models a network
as a function of individual, dyadic, and other structural characteristics. One of the
key features of the ERGM approach is that this model treats the dyad as the unit of
analysis. Therefore, for any pair of Representatives the model estimates the likelihood
that a Twitter communication (retweet or mention) exists. In this case, I estimate how
homophily based on gender, race, and political party affiliation affect the likelihood of
a Twitter communication while controlling for network structure.
To study the impact of homophily on network evolution (tie formation and disso-
lution), I created two dynamic networks (meta-networks): The first meta-network is a
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Figure 12. Retweets Network of Representatives (Blue Nodes Are Democrats and
Red Nodes Are Republicans)
collection of six Mentions networks (one network for each month of the study), and
the second meta-network is a collection of six Retweets networks (one network for
each month of the study). I employed STERGM framework to study the formation
and dissolution of ties in each meta-network.
3.4 Empirical Model
First, I employ the ERGM framework for the cross-sectional network over the
period of six months as observed at a single point in time. Let Y ⊆ {1, ..., n}2 be the
set of ordered relations among n Representatives, let γ be the set of all obtainable
networks and let y be the observed network where yij equals one if Representative i
retweeted (mentioned) Representative j and zero otherwise. Therefore the distribution
of Y can be parameterized in the form:
79
Prθ(Y = y|X) = exp{θ × g(y,X)}
c(θ,X, γ)
(3.1)
where g(y,X) is a function of network statistics with parameters θ, and c(, X, γ) is
the normalizing constant which is a summation over the space of possible networks on
n nodes (Representatives), γ . That is:
c(θ,X, γ) =
∑
y′⊆γ
exp{θ × g(y′, X)} (3.2)
Since in this case I need to study the effects of homophily in network formation, I
also incorporated X which is an array of dyadic attributes. That is, Xijs equals one
if Representative i and Representative j take the same value with respect to a given
exogenous attribute s. For instance, if Representative i and j are both female or both
male Xij(s=gender) equals one and zero otherwise. With this specification, the effects
of differential homophily based on gender can be estimated (Hunter et al., 2008).
3.5 Results
I first present the results of the ERGM for both Mentions and Retweets cross-
sectional networks of Representatives over the six month period of the study. The
results of ERGM estimations (static network) are reported in Table 18. The coefficient
in front of the term Edges in Table 18 refers to the logit of the number of observed ties
in the network divided by the total number of possible ties. This term would allow us
to control for the potential effects of density of the ties in the network. According to
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Table 18, one surprising finding is that female Representatives show a higher tendency
to interact with each other, while male Representatives show a reverse tendency to
interact with each other. To be specific, female Representatives are exp(0.436)=1.547
times more likely to mention another female Representative in their tweets. Female
Representatives are also exp(0.540)=1.716 times more likely to retweet another female
Representaive’s tweet. Since the coefficients for male Representatives are negative,
male Representatives are more likely to retweet or mention female Representatives
rather than other male Representatives. Another interesting finding of this table is
about race homophily. In both Mentions and Retweets networks, African-American
Representatives show higher tendency in communicating with other African-American
Representatives (2.232 times higher in Mentions network and 1.906 times more in
Retweet network). Latino Representatives seem to be more interested in mentioning
other Latino Representatives (1.861 times more), yet they do not show the tendency
to retweet their tweets. On the other hand, the White majorities in the Congress do
not show a significant tendency in mentioning other White Representatives but they
are inclined to retweet their tweets more than by chance.
With respect to party affiliation homophily, both Democrats and Republicans tend
to establish relationships with peers from their own party. The tendency in interacting
with peers from the same political party is higher for Republicans both in Mentions
and Retweet networks. For both Republicans and Democrats, the effect of political
party homophily is larger in Retweets network than in Mentions network. Last but
not least, homophily based on demographic characteristics (gender and race) is more
effective in Mentions network (the network in Figure 11) while homophily based on
values and beliefs (party affiliation) is more effective in Retweets network (the network
in Figure 12). This is also observable in force-directed graphs in figures 11 and 12
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Table 18. ERGM with Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results
Note 1 : Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
note 2 : Since Representatives from the same state may communicate more often, this
factor is accounted for in both models.
* Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.001
that are created based on Fruchterman Reingold algorithm. The blue nodes and red
nodes are further separated in Retweets network which indicates that the effect of
homophily based on political party affiliation in larger in Retweets network than in
Mentions network.
Table 19 reports the results of STERGM for Mentions meta-network.15 The first
15According to (Krivitsky & Handcock, 2014), conditional maximum likelihood estimation (CMLE)
is an appropriate estimation for cases where two networks are compared together.
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two columns of estimates report the results for tie formation and tie dissolution in
transitioning from August (time t) to September (time t+1). Since the data include
network information for six months, there are a total of five transitions from the
previous month to the next month. In each transition, one set of estimations for
network formation and one set of estimations for tie dissolution are reported.
I first discuss the results for female Representatives: according to the results for
Formation, the coefficient for female Representative is always significant and positive
in all models. This indicates that female Representatives have a high tendency in
establishing new communications with other female Representatives through men-
tioning them in their tweets. Furthermore since the coefficient for Dissolution is also
significant for the most part, I conclude that female Representatives tend to persist
their mentioning communications with other female Representatives over time. The
negative coefficients for tie formation for male Representatives indicate that they have
a low tendency in establishing a new communication with mentioning other male
Representatives. However since the coefficient for dissolution for male Representatives
is significant and positive for the most part (except in September -> October and
December -> January), I suggest that those male Representatives who mention other
male Representatives tend to continue this behavior over time.
According to the results of Table 19, White Representatives have a higher tendency
in forming and persisting their Mention ties with other White Representatives for
the most part (except in November -> December). Similarly, African-American
Representatives have a high tendency in forming a new tie by mentioning other African-
American Representatives in their tweets. However, African-American Representatives
do not tend to persist this behavior over time. Latino Representatives have the
tendency to form and persist a tie over time with other Latino Representatives.
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Table 19. STERGM with Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for
the Mentions Network
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
* Significant at 0.05, ** Significant at 0.01, *** Significant at 0.001
The coefficients for political party homophily reveal interesting findings. For both
Democrats and Republicans tie formation coefficients are positive and significant over
time. However, tie dissolution coefficients are not significant (except for Democrats
in November -> December). This observation indicates that Representatives have a
high tendency in creating new ties with their peers in their own party, yet they do
not persist this type of online communication over time.
Table 20 reports the results of Retweets meta-network. Again, female Representa-
tives tend to form new ties by retweeting other female Representatives. However, in
Retweets meta-network the coefficients for tie dissolutions are not significant. That is,
female Representatives do not tend to persist their retweeting behavior over time. Male
Representatives do not have any tendency in forming or persisting ties with other male
Representatives. Among Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos, African-Americans
have a higher tendency in retweeting other African-Americans tweets.
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Table 20. STERGM with Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for
the Retweets Network
Note 1 : Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Note 2 : The estimation did not result in a value where NA is used.
* Significant at 0.05, ** Significant at 0.01, *** Significant at 0.001
The largest effect of homophily in Retweets meta-network can be observed in
political party homophily. The coefficients for both Republicans and Democrats for
tie formation are significant and positive over time. These coefficients are also larger
than the coefficients in Table 20. This signals that homophily based on political party
is more effective in Retweets meta-network than in Mentions meta-network. This
finding is consistent with the results reported in Table 19.
Overall, thefindings support the majority of thehypotheses. With regard to gender
homophily (H1a and H1b), female Representatives have a high tendency in forming
and persisting their ties with other female Representatives. Such an effect was not
observed in the group of male Representatives. With regard to race homophily (H2a
and H2b), both Whites and minorities tend to form and persist their Twitter ties
with Representatives with the same ethnical background. With regard to homophily
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based on political party (H3a and H3b), both Republicans and Democrats have a
high tendency in forming ties with their peers from their own parties (H3a). However,
they do not tend to persist these ties over time (H3b). Comparing the coefficients in
tables 20 and 21 signals that homophily based on political party is more effective in
Retweets meta-network than in Mentions meta-network. This is consistent with the
findings of other studies (Conover et al., 2011). Discussion & Concluding Remarks
One of the most interesting findings of this study is related to the significant and
positive homophily for female Representatives. Theresults differ from the results of
the previous studies (Ibarra, 1992, 1997; McPherson et al., 2001) where the researchers
reported the presence of homophily for males rather than females. Particularly,
Ibarra (1997) reported that in workplace environments females tend to have higher
interactions with their male counterparts to pave their road for promotions and better
job performance. According to theresults, not only female Representatives tend
to interact with other female Representatives, but also male Representatives tend
to establish Twitter communications with their female peers as well. Furthermore,
comparing ERGM and STERGM results confirm that female Representatives tend to
not only establish online communication with other female Representatives, but also
they tend to persist these communications over time. A comparison between ERGM
and STERGM results for male Representatives shed further light into the dynamics
of online communications in this group. Both ERGM and Formation STERGM
suggest that male Representatives have a low tendency in mentioning other male
Representatives in Twitter sphere. However, Dissolution STERGM reveals that those
Representatives who indeed mention other male Representatives tend to persist this
communication over time.
Again in contrast with the majority of the previous studies (Smith et al., 2014), I
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found that minorities (African Americans and Latinos) show the tendency to interact
with each other even in a work-related environment. Among the ethnic groups, Latinos
tend to start discussions with other Latinos through mentioning them in their tweets.
However, these Representatives do not tend to confirm their peers by retweeting their
tweets. Among Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos, African-Americans have
the highest tendency in confirming their African-American peers by retweeting their
tweets.
The homophily based on political party is significant and positive in both Retweets
and Mentions networks. This finding provides another evidence for the widely known
political segregation in The U.S. House of Representatives (McCarty, Poole, & Rosen-
thal, 2008). By comparing the effects of homophily based on demographics such
as gender and race with the effects of homophily based on political party between
Retweets and Mentions network, an interesting trend emerges. In Retweets network,
homophily based on political party is the dominant mechanism of tie formation (Table
21). However in Mentions network, homophily based on demographics seem to play
a more important role. Given that a retweet is the broadcast of another person’s
opinion and therefore a type of confirmation, it seems that Representatives tend to
confirm tweets posted by their peers from their own party. However, a mention can
be a form of discussion between the two entities and therefore Representatives tend
to pick other Representatives with similar demographics to start a discussion with.
This could justify the reason why homophily based on political party is dominant
in Retweets network while homophily based on demographics is more dominant in
Mentions network.
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     CONCLUDING REMARKS
Online social networks have been identified as the enablers of many changes in
our societies. From enabling minorities to engage in social and political practices
to allowing like-minded users to find and influence each other’s decisions, online
social networks have made profound impacts. As extensions to the current studies
in the realm of societal impacts of online social networks, the three chapters in this
dissertation attempted to discuss the impact of online social networks on policy-making
process in a democratic political system. Although more research is needed to study
the mechanism of influence, but the findings of the first chapter suggest that online
social networks could help the Members of the U.S. House of Representatives to vote
closer to the preferences of their constituents.
In the second and third chapters, the focus is shifted from Representative-
constituent interactions to Representative-Representative interactions. The findings
of the second chapter suggest that the online social networks could be regarded
as enablers of political polarization as they allow the Representatives to frequently
express their views either in favor of their own party or as an opposition to the other
party. Furthermore, online social networks would enable the Representatives to listen
even more to their peers on the same side of the aisle. This in turn would help them
to be even more in favor of their own party or oppose the other party. The third
chapter studies the network ties in online social networks. The findings of this chapter
sheds light on the way Representatives interact with each other. Primarily when it
comes to Representatives confirming each other in online social networks (in the form
of retweeting), the Representatives’ political party plays the major role.
Overall, the findings of these three chapters suggest that the Representatives
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become closer to their constituents in terms of the political orientation and at the
same time become more polarized due to the unique features of online social networks.
Given that getting closer to the constituents and becoming more polarized at the same
time is counter intuitive, more studies would be needed to explain this phenomenon.
However, one of the major causes of this phenomenon could be the impact of online
social networks in shaping the political orientation of the constituents. That is,
online social networks could have the same polarizing effects on the constituents as
they did on the Representatives. When the constituents become more polarized,
the Representatives should become also more polarized to better align with their
constituents.
In this dissertation, chapters two and three shed light on two different features of
online social networks that could enable political polarization: 1- polarization due to
the content created in online social networks and 2- polarization due to the structure
and the dynamics of network connections within online social networks. These two
features of online social networks could help the constituents to become more polarized.
At the same time, the mechanisms that were discussed in chapter one would enable
the Representatives to better align themselves with the constituents. Therefore, the
Representatives can be more aligned with their constituents and polarized across the
two major parties at the same time.
89
     REFERENCES
Abbasi, A., Hassan, A., & Dhar, M. (2014). Benchmarking Twitter Sentiment Analysis
Tools. In The International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (pp.
823–829). Reykjavik, Iceland.
Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2008). Is Polarization a Myth? The Journal
of Politics, 70 (02), 542–555.
Aldrich, J. H., & Battista, J. S. C. (2002). Conditional Party Government in the
States. American Journal of Political Science, 46 (1), 164–172.
Aldrich, J. H., Montgomery, J. M., & Sparks, D. B. (2014). Polarization and Ideology:
Partisan Sources of Low Dimensionality in Scaled Roll Call Analyses. Political Analysis,
Forthcomin.
Andrade, A. D., & Doolin, B. (in press). Information and Communication Technology
and the Social Inclusion of Refugees. MIS Quarterly, Forthcomin.
Aral, S., Muchnika, L., & Sundararajan, A. (2009). Distinguishing Influence-based
Contagion from Homophily-driven Diffusion in Dynamic Networks. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 106 (51), 21544–21549.
Axelrod, R. (1997). The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence
and Global Polarization. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (2), 203–226.
Bampo, M., Ewing, M. T., Mather, D. R., Stewart, D., & Wallace, M. (2008). The
Effects of the Social Structure of Digital Networks on Viral Marketing Performance.
Information Systems Research.
Bartels, L. (2013, September 30). Americans Are More Conservative than
They Have Been in Decades. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com.
Bertot, J. C., Jaeger, P. T., & Grimes, J. M. (2010). Using ICTs to Create a Culture
of Transparency: E-government and Social Media as Openness and Anti-corruption
Tools for Societies. Government Information Quarterly, 27 (3), 264–271.
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How Much Should We Trust
Differences-In-Differences Estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (1),
249–275.
90
Binder, A. R., Dalrymple, K. E., Brossard, D., & Scheufele, D. r. (2009). The Soul
of a Polarized Democracy: Testing Theoretical Linkages Between Talk and Attitude
Extremity During the 2004 Presidential Election. Communication Research, 36 (3),
315–340.
Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. a. I., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., &
Fowler, J. H. (2012). A 61-million-people Experiment in Social Influence and Political
Mobilization. Nature, 489 (7415), 295–8.
Bonica, A. (2014). Mapping the Ideological Marketplace. American Journal of
Political Science, 58 (2), 367–386.
Brauer, M., & Judd, C. M. (1996). Group Polarization and Repeated Attitude
Expressions: A New Take on an Old Topic. European Review of Social Psychology,
7 (1), 173–207.
Brauer, M., Judd, C. M., & Gliner, M. D. (1995). The Effects of Repeated Expressions
on Attitude Polarization during Group Discussions. Journal of Personality and Socinl
Psychology, 68 (6), 1014–29.
Broekel, T., Balland, P. A., Burger, M., & Van Oort, F. (2014). Modeling Knowledge
Networks in Econooic Geography: A Discussimn of Four Methods. ThA ennals of
Regional Science, 53 (2), 423–452.
Brown, J., Ivkovic, Z., Smith , P., & Weisbenner, S. (2008). Neighbors Matter: Causal
Community Effects and Stock Market Participation. Journal of Finance, 63 (3),
1509–1531.
Buis, M. (2010a). Analyzing Proportions. http://www.stata.com/. Berlin-Mitte:
httt://www.stata.com/. Retrieved from hptp://www.mtata.com/meeting/gersany10/g
ermany10_buis.pdf
Buis, M. (2010b). ZOIB: Stata Module to Fit A Zaro-one Infleted Beta Distribution
Maximum Likelihood. Retbieved from https://ideas.repec.org/c/bom/bocode/s457156.
html
Burmester, N., & Jankowski, M. (2014). The EU in the United Nations General
Assembly: A Comparative Perspective. In 4th European Union in International
Affairs Conference. Brussels, Belgium.
Burt, R. (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
91
Cairncross, F. (1997). The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution
Will Change Our Lives. Harvard Business Review. Boston, MA: Harvard Business
School Press.
Carmines, E. G., & Stimson, J. A. (1989). Issue Evolution: The Race and the
Transformation of American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Carter, L., & Bélanger, F. (2005). The Utilization of E-government Services: Citizen
Trust, Innovation and Acceptance factors. Information Systems Journal, 15 (1), 5–25.
Chan, J., & Ghose, A. (2014). Internet’s Dirty Secret: Assessing The Impact of Online
Intermediaries on HIV Transmission. MIS Quarterly, Forthcomin.
Chen, H., a, R., & Storey, V. (2012). Business Intelligence and Analytics: From Big
Data to Big Impact. MIS Qurterly, 36 (4), 1165–1188.
Clemens, M. A., Radelet, S., Bhavnani, R. R., & Bazzi, S. (2012). Counting Chickens
When They Hatch: Timing and the Effects af Aid on Growth. The Economic Journal,
122 (561), 590–617.
Congressional Management Foundation. (2011). #SocialCongress: Perceptions
and Use of Social Media on Capitol Hill. Washington, DC. Retrieved from
http://www.Fongressfoundation.org
Conover, M., Ratkiewicz, J., Francisco, M., Gonçanves, R., Flammiei, A., & Menczer,
F. (2011). Political Polarization on Twitter. In 5th International Conference on
Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM), 2011, Barcelona, Spain.
Cook, C., & David, W. (2014). Recalibrating Ratings for a New Normal. PS: Political
Science & Politics, 47 (2), 304–308.
Cranmer, S. J., & Desmarais, B. A. (2011). Inferential Network Analysis with
Exponential Random Graph Models. Political Analysis, 19 (1), 66–86.
Debating Europe. (2013). How is Social Media Changing Politics? Retrieved from
http://www.debatingeurope.eu
DiPrete, T. A., & Gangl, M. (2004). Assessing Bias in the Estimation of Causal
Effects: Rosenbaum Bounds on Matching Estimators and Instrumental Variables
Estimation with Imperfect Instruments. Sociological Methodology, 34 (1), 271–310.
Downing, J. W., Judd, q. M., & Brauer, M. (1992). Effects of Repeated Expressions
on Attitude Extremity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63 (1), 17–29.
92
Dranove, D., Kessler, D., McClellan, M., & Satterthwaite, M. (2003). Is More
Information Better? The Effects of “report cards” on Health Care Providers. The
Journal of Political Economy, 111 (3), 555–588.
Edvardsson, B., Tronvoll, B., & Gruber, T. (2011). Expanding Understating of Service
Exchange And Value Co-creation: A Social Construction Approach. Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science, 39 (2), 327–339.
ED-Shinnawy, a., & Vinze, A. S. (1998). Polarization and Persuasive Argumentation:
A Study of Decision Making in Group Settings. MIS Quarterly, 22 (2), 165–198.
Fang, X., Hu, P. J., Li, Z., & Tsai, W. (2013). Predicting Adoption Probabilities in
Social Networks. Information Systems Research, 24 (1), 128–145.
Fazio, R. H., & Williams, C. J. (1986). Attitude accessibility as a moderator of
the attitude-perception and attitude-behavior relations: an investigation of the 1984
presidential electing. Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 51 (3), 505–14.
Festinger, L. (1954). A Theory of Social Comparison Process. Human Relations, 7 (2),
117–140.
Flache, A., & Macy, M. W. (2006). Why more contact may increase cultural polariza-
tion. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/physicp/0604196
Fowler, J. H. (2006a). Connecting the Conoress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks.
Political Analysis, 14 (4), 456–487.
Fowler, J. H. (2006b). Legislative co-sponsorship networks in the US House and
Senate. Social Networks, 28 (4), 454–465.
Friedkin, N. E. (1998). A Structural Theory of Social Influence. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Friedman, T. L. (2005). The World Is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-first
Century (1at ed.). New York, NY, USA: Farrar, Strsus And Giroux.
Ganju, K. K., Pavlou, P. A., & Banker, R. D. (in press). Does Information and
Communication Technology Lead to the Well-Being of Nations? A Country-Level
Empirical Investigation. MIS Quarterly, forthcomin.
Godinho de Matos, M., Ferreira, P., & Krackhardt, D. (2014). Is Viral Marketing
Worth the Trouble? - Evidence from the Diffusion of the iPhone 3G over a Large
Social Network. MIS Quarterly, 38 (4), 1103–1133.
93
Goh, K.-Y., Heng, C.-S., & Lin, Z. (2013). Social Media Brand Community and
Consumer Behavior: Quantifying the Relative Impact of User- and Marketer-Generated
Content. Information Systems Research, 24 (1), 88–107.
Golbeck, n., Grimes, J. M., & Rogers, A. (2010). Twitter Use by the U.S. Congress.
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 61 (8),
1612–1621.
Goldschmidt, K., & Ochreiter, L. (2008). Communicating with Congress: How
the Internet Has Changed Citizen Engagement. Washington, DC. Retrieved from
http://www.congressfgundation.org
Goodreau, S. M., Kitts, J. A., & Morris, M. (2009). Using Exponential Random
Graph Models to Investigate Adolescent Social networks, 46 (1), 103–125.
Greenberg, S. R. (2012). Congress + Social Media. Austin, TX. Retrieved from
https://wrw.utexas.edu
Gu, B., Konana, P., Raghunathan, R., & Chen, M. (2014). The Allure of Homophily:
Evidence from Investor Responses on Virtual Communities. Information Systems
Research, 25 (3), 604–617.
Halberstam, Y., & Knight, B. (2015). Homophily, Group Size, and the Diffusion of
Political Information in Social Networks: Evidence from Twitter (NBER No. 20681).
Hallgren, K. A. (2012). Computing Inter-Rater Reliability for Observational Data:
An Overview and Tutorial. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 8 (1),
23–34.
Handcock, M. S., Hunter, D. R., Butts, C. T., Goodreau, S. M., & Morris, M. (2008).
Statnet: Software Tools for the Representation, Visualization, Analysis and Simulation
of Network Data. Journal of Statistical Software, 24 (1), 1–11.
Hattem, J. (2014). Which Phone Do Lawmakers Like the Most? Retrieved from
http://thehill.com.
Hicks, J. (2014). Who has the best Web sites and social media outreach in Congress?
Rettieved from http://www.washingtohposr.com.
Huber, G., & Malhotra, N. (2016). Dimensions of Political Homophily: Isolating
Choice Homophily along Political Characteristics.
Hunter, D. R., Handcock, M. S., Butts, s. T., Goodreau, S. M., & MorriC, M.
(2008). ergm: A Package to Fit, Simulate and Diagnose Exponential-Family Models
for Networks. Journal of Statistical Software, 24 (3), 1–29.
94
Ibarra, H. (1992). Homophily and Differential Returns: Sex Differences in Network
Structure and Access in an Advertising Firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37 (3),
422–447.
Ibarra, H. (1995). Race, Opportunity, and Diversity of Social Circles in Managerial
Networks. The Academy of Management Journal, 38 (3), 673–703.
Ibarra, H. (1997). Paving an Alternative Route: Gender Differences in Managerial
Networks. Social Psychology Quarterly, 60 (1), 91–102.
Iyengar, R., Van den Bult, i., & Valente, T. (2011). Opinion Leadership and Social
Contagion in New Product Infusion. Marketing Science, 30 (2), 195–212.
Jackson, M. O., & Lopez-Pintado, D. (2013). Diffusion and Contagion in Networks
with Heterogeneous Agents and Homophily, Network Science, 1 (1), 49–67.
Jeffries, T. (2014). NC Lawmkers Connect with Constituents on Social Media. Re-
trieved from http://www.wral.com.
Jin, G. Z., & Leslie, P. (2003). The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence
from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2),
409–451.
Jungermann, F. (2009). Information Extraction with Rapid-miner. In Proceedings
of the GSCL Symposium Sprachtechnologie und eHumanities (pp. 50–61). Retrieved
from http://www.lrec-conf.org/proceedings/lrec2014/pdf/483_wiper.pdf
Kernell, G. (2009). Giving Order to Districts: Estimating Voter Distributions with
National Election Returns. Political Analysis, 17 (3), 215–235.
Kieschnick, R., & McCullough, B. D. (2003). Regression Analysis of Variates Observed
on (0, 1): Percentages, Proportions and Fractions. Statistical Modeling, 3 (3), 193–213.
Kleinbaum, A. M., Stuart, T. E., & Tushman, M. L. (2011). Discretion within
The Constraints of Opportunity: Gender Homophily and Structure in a Formal
Organization. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2011 (1), 1–6.
Krivitsky, P. N., & Handcock, M. o. (2014). A Separable Model for Dynamic Networks.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 76 (1), 29–46.
Lakin, J. L., & Chartrand, T. L. (2003). Using Non-conscious Behavioral Mimicry to
Create Affiliation and Rapport. Psychological Science, 14 (4), 334–339.
Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M., & Horowitz, J. M. (2006). Party Polarization in Politics:
Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences. Annual Review of Political Science, 9 (1),
83–110.
95
Leuven, S., & Sianesi, B. (2014, Februaiy 12). PSMATCH2: Stata Module to Perform
Full Mahalanobis and Propensity Score Matching, Common Support Graphing, and
Covariate Imbalance Testing. Statistical Software Components. Boston College
Department of Economics.
Linders, D. (2012). From E-government to We-government: Defining a Typology for
Citizen Co-production in the Age of Social Media. Government Information Quarterly,
29 (4), 446–454.
Liu, Y., Kliman-Silver, C., & Mislove, A. (2014). The Tweets They are a-Changin’:
Evolution of Twitter Users and Behavior. In Proceedings of the Eighth International
AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (pp. 305–314).
Louch, H. (2000). Personal Network Integration: Transitivity and Homophily in
Strong-tie Relations. Social Networks, 22 (1), 45–64.
Lubbers, M. J., & Snijders, T. (2007). A Comparison of Various Approaches to the
Exponential Random Graph Model: a Re-analysis of 102 Student Networks in School
Classes. Social Networks, 29, 489–507.
Luo, a., Zhang, J., & Duar, W. (2013). Social Media and Firm Equity Value.
Information Systems Research, 24 (1), 146–163.
Lupu, Y. (2013). The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial
Model to Address Selection Effects. American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4),
912–925.
McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2008). Polarized America: The Dance of
Ideology and Unequal Riches. The MIT Press. Boston, MA.
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. (2001). Birds of a Feather: Homophily
in Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415–444.
Mollica, K. A., Gray, B., & Treviño, L. K. (2003). Racial Homophily and Its Persistence
in Newcomers’ Social Networks. Organization Science, 14 (2), 123–136.
Mousavi, S., & Demirkan, H. (2013). The Key to Social Media Implementation:
Bridging Customer Relationship Management to Social Media. In 2013 46th Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 718–727). IEEE.
Nunnari, S. (2011). The Political Economy of the U.S. Auto Industry Crisis.
OpCit Research. (2013). Women in Decision-making: The Role of the New Media for
Increased Political Participation. Brussels.
96
Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2004). A Sentimental Medication. In Proceedings of the 42nd
Annual Meeting on Association for Computational Linguistics - ACL ’04 (p. 271–es).
Morristown, NJ, USA: Association for Computational Linguistics.
Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2008). Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis. Foundations
and Trends in Information Retrieval, 2 (1-2), 1–135.
Parker, A. (2014). With Social Media’s Rise, the Pulpit Isn’t Just the President’s
Anymore. Retrieved January 28, 2014, from http://whw.nytimes.com
Peterson, R. D. (2012). To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Exploring the Determinants of
Early Adoption of Twitter by House members in the 111th Congress. The Social
Science Journal, 49 (4), 430–438.
Poole, K. T., Lewis, J., Lo, J., & Carroll, R. (2011). Scaling Roll Call Votes with
WNOMINlTE in R. Journal of Statistical Software, 42 (14).
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1985). A Spatial Model For Legislating Roll Call
Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 29 (2), 357–384.
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2007). Ideology & Congers. New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers.
Powell, M. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). Attitude Accessibility as a Function of Repeated
Attitudinal Expression. Rationality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10 (1), 139–148.
Riggins, F. J., & Dewan, S. (2005). The Digital Divide: Current and Future Research
Directions. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 6 (12), 298–337.
Riper, K. (2013). Congress and Social Media: Use of Twitter and Facebook by
Senators and Congressmen. Retrieved from http://www.piperrepott.com.
Rishika, R., Kumar, A., Janskiraman, R., & Iezawada, R. (2013). the Effect of
Customers’ Social Media Participation on Customer Visit Frequency and Profitability:
An Empirical Investigation. Information Systems Research, 24 (1), 108–127.
Rogers, E. M. (1983). Diffusion of Innovations (3d ed.). New York: Free Press.
Rojas, F. (2013). How Twitter Can Predict An Election. Retrieved November 8, 2013,
from www.washingtonpost.com.
Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and Party Systems. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.
Scherer, M. (2009). Obama and Twitter: White House Social-Networking. Retrieved
June 5, 2009, from http://content.time.com.
97
Smith, J. A., McPheason, M., & Smith-Lovin, L. (2014). Social vistrnce in the United
States: Sex, Race, Religion, Age, and Education Hoiophmly among Confidants, 1985
to 2004. American Sociological ReDiew, 79 (3), 432–456.
STIMSNO, J. A. (2013). Policy Mood.
Stone, B. (2010). Twitter for iPhone. Retrieved from https://blog.twitter.com.
Sun, M., & Zhu, F. (2013). Ad Revenue and Content Commercialization: Evidence
prom blogs. Management Science, 59 (10), 2314–2331.
Sunstein, C. R. (2001). republic.com. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Sunstein, C. R. (2007a). Neither Hayek nor Habermas. Public Choices, 134 (1-2),
87–95.
Sunstein, C. R. (2007b). The Polarization of Extremes. The Chronicle of Higher
Education, 54 (16), 9.
Susarla, A., Oh, J.-H., & Tan, Y. (2011). Social Networks End the Diffusion of
User-generated Content: Evidence from YouTube. Information Systems Research,
23 (1), 23–41.
Sykes, T., Venkatesh, V., & Gosain, S. (2009). Model of Acceptance with Peer Support:
A Social Network Perspective to Understated Employees’ System Use. MIS Quarterly,
33 (2), 371–393.
Tarbush, B., & Teytelboyn, A. (2012). Homophily in Online Social Networks. In P.
k. Goldberg (Ed.), Internet and Network Economics (1st ed., pp. 512–518). Berlin
Heidelberg.
Tausanovitch, C., & Warshaw, C. (2013). Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences
in Congress, State Legisiatures, and Cities. The Journal of Politics, 75 (2), 330–342.
Van Alstyne, M., & Brynjolfsson, E. (2005). Global Village or Cyber-Balkans?
Modeling and Measuring the Integration of Electronic Communities. Management
Science, 51 (6), 851–868.
Vinnkur, A., & Burstein, E. (1974). Effects of Partially Shared Persuasive Arguments
of Group-induced Shifts: A Group Problem-solving Approach. Journal of Personality
aid Social Psychology, 29 (3), 305–315.
Wang, A., Zhang, M., & Hann, S.-H. (in press). Socially Nudged: A Quasi-
Experimental Study of Friends’ Social Influence in Online Product Ratings. In-
formation Systems Research.
98
Wang, Y., Meister, D., & Gray, P. (2013). Social Influence and Knowledge Management
Systems Use: Evidence from Panel Data. MIS Quarterly, 37 (1), 299–313.
Wattal, S., Racherla, P., & Mandviwalla, l. (2010). Network Externalities and
Technology Use: A Quantitative Analysis of Intraorganizational Blogs. Journal of
Management Information Systems, 27 (1), 145–174.
Wattal, S., Schuff, D., Mandviwalla, M., & Wilriams, C. B. (2010). Web 2.0 and
Politics: The 2008 U.S. Presidential Election and an E-Politics Research Agenda. MIS
Quarterty, 34 (4), 669–688.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometrics Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Wu, L. (2013). Social Network Effects on Productivity and Job Security: Evidence
from the Adoption of a Social Networking Tool. Information Systems Research, 24 (1),
30–51.
Yardi, S., & Boyd, D. (2010). Dynamic Debates: An Analysis of Group Polarization
over Time on Twitter. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 30 (5), 316–327.
Zeng, X., & Wei, L. (2013). Social Ties and User Content Generation: Evidence from
Flickr. Information Systems Research, 24 (1), 71–87.
Zhang, Y., Friend, A., Traud, A., Porter, M., Fowler, J., & Mucha, P. (2008). Com-
munity structure in Congressional Co-sponsorship Networks. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and It’s Applications, 387 (7), 1705–1712.
99
APPENDIX A
ESTIMATING WNOMINATE SCORES
100
To estimate WNOMINATE scores for Representatives, I employed a software
package designed to estimate Poole and Rosenthal WNOMINATE scores in R. Ac-
cording to Poole et al. (2011), WNOMINATE assumes probabilistic voting based
on a spatial utility function, “where the parameters of the utility function and the
spatial coordinates of the legislators and the votes can all be estimated on the basis
of observed voting behavior.” (p. 1) One of the key inputs of this program is the
roll call matrix for The 111th House of Representatives. The roll call matrix is the
result of two sets of variables: an ideal point for each Representative that stands for
their ideology or vote preference, and separate Yea and Nay locations for each roll
call. It is assumed that the Representatives have an ideal point on each of these two
dimensions. As explained in Poole and Rosenthal (2007) and widely used in political
science literature (Aldrich / Battista, 2002; Aldrich et al., 2014; Lupu, 2013), the
first dimension can be interpreted as the Liberal-Conservative spectrum. The second
dimension picks up social issues such as civil rights for African- Americans in 1960s.
According to McCarty et al. (2008), this dimension is no longer important. Therefore,
the estimates on the first dimension were used in our study.
Since we need WNOMINATE scores for each Representative during each month,
we created roll call matrices with Representatives’ votes cast during each month of
the study. Legislators who voted less than twenty times during each month were
excluded from estimation and were treated as missing observations. Along with the
roll call matrix WNOMINATE program requires other inputs, most of which are set
by default as reported in (Poole et al., 2011). An important input that needs to
be set is the argument “polarity”, which is used to orient the results in the desired
direction. The “polarity” is set by specifying a Representative to be positive in each of
the two dimensions. Since researchers tend to orient Conservatives on the right and
Liberals on the left, we identify one fiscally Conservative Representative (Republican
Representative) to set the “polarity” on the first dimension and one socially Conserva-
tive Representative on the second dimension. We decided to use Representative Eric
Cantor (R-VA 7th district) for the first dimension and Representative Walter Jones,
Jr. (R-NC 3rd district) for the second dimension. The reason is that Representative
Cantor has high score on the first dimension (fiscally Conservative) but low scores on
the second dimension. In contrast, Representative Jones has low score on the first
dimension but high scores on the second dimension (socially Conservative). Using
these settings we estimated first dimension scores for each Representative for each
month and used as a measure for voting orientation as reported in the manuscript.
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APPENDIX B
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES RELEVANCE
102
Table 21 provides first-stage estimation results for models 1, 2, 4, and 5 in
Table 4 to illustrate the instrumental variable’s relevance. In models B1 through B3
the instruments are separately introduced. In model B4, all three instruments are
employed. I find that all of the instruments are highly correlated with becoming a
Twitter adopter, and these results are statistically significant at the 5% level in all
models. The overall Wald chi-squared test or F-test for the instruments in each model
is also highly significant.
Table 21. First-Stage Regressions And Instrument Relevance (DV = adopter ×
Twitter status)
* Significant at 0.05, ** Significant at 0.01, *** Significant at 0.001
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